Sunday, May 29, 2011

Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland

Our Muslim Troubles

Part Four: The Military and the Paramilitaries


“A key difference between the Troubles and our Muslim Troubles is that there will be no hinterlands, no rural areas, in which Muslims can operate with a minimum of attention being paid to them… This will be quite a disadvantage for Muslim paramilitaries, to put it mildly.”

This is the fourth of a five-part series by El Inglés comparing and contrasting the Troubles in Northern Ireland with the coming Muslim Troubles in Britain. Previously: Part One, Part Two, and Part Three.

The entire series will be made published as a single document in pdf format after the final part is posted at Gates of Vienna.

As I have reminded readers before: El Inglés’ scenarios are descriptive, not normative. This is not advocacy, but an analysis of the likely future for Britain.


Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland


by El Inglés

VIII. Paramilitaries: Core Objectives


We have considered how the descent into violent conflict is likely to take place, and attained some familiarity with how Irish republicanism terrorism compares with loyalist terrorism on the one hand and Muslim terrorism on the other. Thus prepared, let us consider what we can expect of British and Muslim paramilitaries when our Muslim Troubles begin in earnest.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *

In the early stages of the conflict, violence is likely to be spontaneous, disorganized, and relatively low in fatalities due to the lack of availability of weapons and the vigorous riot control efforts of the authorities. However, once the Rubicon has been crossed and it has become clear to both sides that any sort of peaceful coexistence is impossible, cooler heads on both sides will start asking themselves what their long-term objectives should be and how they are most likely to be achieved.

We should first dispense with that which is relatively trivial and easy to predict and describe: the likely nature of Muslim violence towards the British. Muslim terrorist violence is so commonplace these days that its basic nature is perfectly clear. It is not complacent to suppose that Muslims will direct a type of violence at the British very similar to that that they already direct at people who provoke their ire. Muslims will be looking mainly to consolidate geographically, establishing zones within which they have control, within which the police cannot operate, and through which people considered to be outsiders cannot pass. They will accomplish this by rioting and attacking the police as and when they try to enter ‘their’ areas. Meanwhile, hard-line Muslims will undoubtedly work to enforce their own versions of sharia law within these enclaves. These efforts will be complemented by a heightened degree of terrorist activity of the type Muslims are already engaged in.

In short, Muslims will simply be doing more of what they are doing already, and trying to do it more consistently and with greater and more permanent effect. Far more worthy of detailed analysis is the likely nature of the violence of the British paramilitaries which have not yet emerged and whose activities are therefore, at present, the great unknowns ahead of us. The only obvious precedent we have in this regard is the loyalist terrorism we have already glanced at. During the Troubles, there were two paramilitary ‘teams’: republican paramilitaries (most obviously the PIRA, but also the OIRA, INLA, etc.), whose aims were to bring an end to British rule in NI and bring about a united Ireland of whatever sort, and loyalist paramilitaries (most obviously the UDA and UVF), whose aims were to keep NI in the United Kingdom and maintain Protestant political dominance there.

Core Objectives of British Paramilitaries

We point out here that we are focusing primarily on the early and middle stages of this conflict. The permanent departure of the bulk of the Muslim population of the UK may well be the ultimate strategic objective of many British paramilitaries, but it is not something that they can reasonably work towards in the short or, probably, even the medium term, so we will put it to one side here and ask what plausible short- and medium-term objectives British paramilitaries will likely establish for themselves. The only way to try and do this is to: a) assume that they will adopt sensible objectives, b) assume that we have the insight required to determine what would actually be sensible objectives, and c) to conclude that British paramilitaries will therefore adopt the strategies we consider to be sensible. Of course, this is a great arrogance on our part, but we cannot proceed without it.

What then, would constitute a viable, reasonable set of strategic objectives for a British paramilitary organization or organizations to formulate after a descent into the widespread ethno-sectarian violence we predict here? Most obviously, it would include the following:

  • Geographical consolidation
  • Establishment of the principle of retaliation
  • Assassination of key Muslims considered hostile
  • Assassination of key non-Muslims considered hostile
  • Establishment and display of technical expertise required to pull off ‘spectaculars’

We will take these five objectives as being core objectives, the absolute bare minimum that any self-respecting broad-reach paramilitary organization could settle for in the early stages of a conflict. We will explore each in turn.

1) Geographical Consolidation

At the outbreak of our Muslim Troubles, we will have an archipelago of Muslim-dominated areas of towns and cities loosely strung out across the Greater London area, the West Midlands, and the North West of England. Some of these areas will be in a state of outright hostilities with the surrounding British populations, some relatively peaceful but in a state of high tension and on the verge of hostilities. There is a crucial point here that must be understood if one is to have any grasp of the basic strategic situation that will obtain between British and Muslims: if one cannot extend numerical control over the enemy population in a tribal conflict of the type we are headed for, then extending geographical control over that population becomes a matter of overriding importance. In other words, if one cannot wave a magic wand over the Muslim population of the UK and make it disappear, then one must confine it to certain areas of the country, outside of which the ability of its members to contaminate and degrade the lives of the British people is reduced virtually to zero. Growing Muslim numbers combined with a lack of geographical control will create such an intolerable situation that it must and will be violently rejected sooner or later.

Let us divide the whole of the UK up into three non-contiguous zones, Zones A, B, and C. Zone A refers to all those locations out of which, in a tribal conflict, Muslims could not be driven by force without driving them out of the UK, such as parts of London, parts of Birmingham, Bradford and so on. Muslims could not meaningfully flee these places for other destinations in the UK as all other destinations (Penzance, Canterbury, the Scottish Highlands, etc.) would only leave them even more exposed. Zone A is concentrated in the Greater London area, the West Midlands, and the north-west of England.

Zone B refers to areas out of which Muslims could meaningfully be driven without being driven out of the UK, but within which they have sufficiently large numbers, geographically concentrated to a sufficient extent, that they are not an atomised presence whose people, homes and businesses can be attacked on an isolated basis. There will be countless towns and cities across the country whose Muslim populations are such that they meet this description, such as Cardiff, Bristol, and Nottingham. These places form Zone B, which exists in a scattered, pinprick fashion across virtually the whole of England, and parts of Scotland and Wales.

Zone C consists of every other part of the UK, where Muslims exist not at all or only in very small numbers, and are of necessity scattered throughout the surrounding population in terms of where they live and work. They do not exist in large enough numbers to dominate neighbourhoods, and cannot seal themselves off from the outside world to any significant extent at all. Zone C, by definition, includes everywhere in the UK outside of Zones A and B, and accounts for the overwhelming majority of the land mass of the country.

Geographical consolidation, in a nutshell, consists of forcing Muslims in Zone C to Zones A and B, and, eventually, Muslims in Zone B to Zone A. We note that Muslims in Zone C are, by definition, few and scattered. Furthermore, they will often be running catering businesses that serve the public in the area they live in, and that are open to being disrupted by anything from a brick through the plate glass front window to an arson attack staged in earnest. Restaurants tend to take a disproportionate fraction of their revenue on just a couple of days of the week, so disruption on these days would be the most obvious way of driving them out of the area in question. This could probably be done without actually having to hurt or kill anyone, which would be useful from a propaganda point of view.

If Muslims in Zone C prove resistant to this sort of coercion, then attacks on their homes or persons will likely be resorted to in order to up the stakes. Again, readers should bear in mind that we are talking here about rural areas, with low concentrations of CCTV cameras and other elements of the surveillance state. A small group of dedicated and disciplined people, familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of the Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) system and similar law enforcement tools, and with the discipline to maintain a degree of discretion about their activities, could probably exert considerable relocation pressure on Muslims across hundreds of square miles of Zone C. If they were prepared to use violence up to and including the lethal as and when they deemed it necessary, then it is hard to see how isolated Muslims could continue to function at all in that part of Zone C to which the paramilitaries had turned their attentions. Would one really fancy the chances of a hypothetical Pakistani trying to run a curry house in Swaffham, Norfolk (population 6,935 according to the 2001 census) when the hard men of that good county had committed themselves to burning said curry house to the ground by hook or by crook, with its proprietor inside if necessary?

We say again that it is hard to see how the police could respond to a team of the type we have already described. We are not talking here about a bunch of drunken yobs putting the odd brick through a window after a hard night’s drinking. We are talking about ruthless and organized people who are part of larger organizations with specific, even nationwide, strategic objectives, one of which is the complete expulsion of Muslims from Zone C. Short of having a permanent police presence outside every Muslim home and establishment, which is obviously impossible, it is difficult to see how the police could take any effective action at all.

As we will discuss in more detail later, a descent into tribal violence between British and Muslims will so overwhelm the apparatus of state that trying to protect isolated Muslims in Zone C is likely to prove a project that the state will abandon quickly. This will render these operations relatively cost-free for the British paramilitaries engaged in them. Given that they will require little in the way of technical or operational expertise (contrast with, for example, the PIRA’s mortar attack on Downing Street in 1991), there will be no obvious operational barriers to engaging in them, and they will probably attract people we shall euphemistically refer to as freelancers as well.

As a consequence of the foregoing considerations, the Muslim presence in Zone C must be expected to fall very quickly if British paramilitaries seriously apply themselves to bringing it down. What of Zone B? This is the hardest zone to define, but let us take Cardiff as being the most obvious Zone B location in Wales. Cardiff has a population of about 340,000 people, of whom 11,000—12,000 seem to be Muslims. The brick-through-your-window-and-then-a-petrol-bomb-if-you’re-stubborn modus operandi of those pushing Muslims out of Zone C will almost certainly be ineffective in the context of a Zone B city like Cardiff. When Muslims are concentrated in certain neighbourhoods, their ability to keep an eye on those coming and going will obviously increase, as will their ability to riot in response to violence or intimidation. In addition, the greater concentration of CCTV and similar technologies in larger towns and cities will make the process more operationally demanding and prone to result in the incarceration of would-be geographical consolidators. This makes pushing Muslims from Zone B to Zone A a qualitatively different process to pushing them from Zone C to Zones A and B, and one that probably cannot be achieved without the ability to inflict damage widely and indiscriminately in Muslim areas of Zone B. To be blunt, this means bombing them, a matter we will discuss later. Suffice it to say here that pushing Muslims from Zone B to Zone A would be a much more difficult and bloody process than pushing them from Zone C to Zone B.

The relative costs and benefits of forcing Muslims out of Zone C and into Zones A and B, and, gradually, out of Zone B into Zone A will be such that it is hard to imagine British paramilitaries not doing it. This form of broad geographical consolidation will have massive effects. It will make it clear to Muslims that Britain is not their country, and that that portion of it that they can freely access without fear of violence is actually very small. It will also have a huge morale-boosting effect for the British themselves, in that it will substantially bring to a halt the conversion of the urban UK into Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Somali enclaves, and restricting the growth of Islam to those areas it has already most contaminated. Readers can consider this a quarantine if they so desire. Either way, it is the conversion of a vast swathe of the UK into a fully-fledged no-go zone for Muslims, which will be a huge step forward in its own right. It will also be a huge challenge to the authority of state itself, and one which will demonstrate its impotence.

If all Muslims were to end up in Zone A, then geographical consolidation would be complete. Muslim population growth will presumably result in them putting demographic pressure on currently non-Muslim areas in Zone A, but that is another matter. Getting Muslims out of Zone A and back to their countries of origin would, in principle, require massive paramilitary violence and/or the intervention of the state itself and is therefore outside the scope of the essay.

2) Establishment of the Principle of Retaliation

This principle is largely self-explanatory, but is still one of the core objectives, and must therefore be discussed here. Most British paramilitaries would, given the opportunity, presumably focus their violent endeavours on those members of the Muslim community who were out to do the British people harm in some fashion. However, identifying and acting against these people is a task which taxes the resources of the security apparatus itself, and which is therefore certainly not going to be achievable by paramilitaries.[11] However, given that Muslims will certainly inflict violence upon the British, the matter of prevention arises, and it is virtually guaranteed that British paramilitaries will respond as loyalist paramilitaries did during the Troubles: by killing random Muslims.

Acknowledging the strategic sense in killing random civilians during tribal conflict is not the done thing during these times of relative peace and civility, but the underlying logic is as unassailable as it is brutal. If Muslims detonate a car bomb in the centre of London and kill 100 people, and if the perpetrators of such attacks cannot be identified in advance, then the only obvious way of trying to deter them from conducting similar attacks in future will be to have them understand that every time they kill one British person, they are also killing one or more Muslims. This is no different to what the loyalist paramilitaries were doing during the Troubles when they would kill randomly-selected Catholics.

How effective such a strategy would prove in deterring further killings is impossible to determine in advance. But the possibility that this strategy might not succeed does not render it ill-advised or foolish. Given that wars tend to have losers, there is always some group of people whose strategies are being proved inadequate in some sense. During the Pacific War, the Japanese strategy was to launch lightning attacks throughout south-east Asia, secure a huge resource base, and build up a strong enough naval deterrent to inflict such casualties on an American counter-attack across the Pacific as to force America to seek terms rather than fight the war to a conclusion. The fact that this strategy failed does not mean that it did not make any sense. It simply means that it did not work, which is not necessarily the same thing.

Exactly how far retaliatory killings go will be dependent on how many British people Muslim paramilitaries can kill, and therefore, substantially, on the efficiency of the security service and the vigilance of the British public. It is clear that, in principle, there is no limit to the amount of violence that could be perpetrated to obtain this strategic objective.

3) Assassination of Key Muslims

Britain already contains all sorts of Muslim organizations and individuals who are, to a greater or lesser extent, outspoken in service of their religious tribalism and at the expense of Britain and the British people. From Anjem Choudary (whose probable violent demise no great foresight is required to predict) to the Muslim talking heads who tell us that drawing cartoons of Mohammed should be banned on grounds of community cohesion, Britain during our Muslim Troubles will be a breathtakingly target-rich environment even for those British paramilitaries who have a hands-off policy with respect to ‘normal’ Muslims. Like a child in a sweet factory, the main difficulty will be in deciding where to start.

Ruthlessly cutting down those Muslims who are seen as being hostile, subversive, or seditious will serve to impress upon Muslims that the days of multicultural genuflection to their sensitivities are over. Though the numbers of people assassinated in this manner would probably be relatively low compared to the numbers who could be killed in spectaculars (discussed below) aimed at mass civilian targets, the psychological and morale effects would be huge. Note also that should it be the case that the British government responds to the violence we predict by looking for a ‘partner for peace’ in the Muslim community to make concessions to, the assassination of the key Muslim players will have a salutary effect in persuading said government of the obstacles such a road is likely to present them with. Partners for peace are of little use if they are dead, and their deaths will likely serve to impress upon both government and Muslims the foolishness of attempting to further undermine the British people and their way of life.

4) Assassination of Key Britons

Following on closely from the previous objective, the assassination of key British traitors and collaborators will be an obvious goal for British paramilitaries. Such ruthless folk as the paramilitary types we envisage here will have little compunction about killing people perceived to be on the other side, most obviously politicians, public intellectuals, far left activists, and journalists. Activities of this sort will help impress upon the British public as a whole that British paramilitaries believe themselves to be in a war, and that war requires that traitors and enablers of the enemy be acted against ruthlessly.

5) Spectaculars — Technical Expertise and Display

Though the core objectives do not include attempts to persuade government to act in any particular manner, they do include the demonstration, to government and other interested parties, of the capacity to act in such a manner as to utterly disrupt the normal function of society in Muslim areas, and the inability of the government to do anything to prevent this from happening. This will in turn allow the paramilitaries in question to put a great deal of pressure on government to act in the required fashion later on, when specific actions are required of it.

When we talk of spectaculars, we are, of course, making reference to the spectaculars pulled off by the PIRA in the 1990s in London and Manchester. These huge bombings, at the Baltic Exchange in 1992, Bishopsgate in 1993, and Canary Wharf and Manchester in 1996, caused devastation in the areas where they took place, some causing damage to the tune of hundreds of millions of pounds. In keeping with our earlier observations about IRA strategy, these bombings did not kill many people, especially when one takes into account their huge size: three people were killed at the Baltic Exchange, one at Bishopsgate, none in Manchester, and two at Canary Wharf. Their main objective was to cause financial damage and disrupt the everyday function of the areas they targeted.

We have already mentioned geographical consolidation, which is, of course, essentially a euphemism for ethno-religious cleansing. In this context, we discussed the relative ease of pushing Muslims from Zone C to Zone B, and the relative difficulty of pushing them from Zone B to Zone A. This objective would probably have to be achieved, at least in some cases, by car bombings, as Zone B Muslim areas are, by definition, too large and robust for isolated attacks on single targets to be able to uproot them with consistency. Of course, these attacks would have the potential to kill large numbers of Muslim passers-by if conducted without warnings. This large-scale killing is not one of the core objectives (except in the hypothetical case in which it takes place as a retaliatory attack), so we assume that British paramilitaries will try and avoid it at the stages of the conflict we are describing here. Nonetheless, this objective and the geographical consolidation objective may end up dovetailing with the use of car bombs against Muslim residential or commercial areas either at night or with warnings to limit casualties.

IX. Paramilitaries: State Response


An Outline of the Problem

If the collapse of civil order accompanying the onset of our Muslim Troubles is on the scale that we predict, deploying the British Army will be the only way the government can try to restore a semblance of order in the worst-afflicted areas. Though the police will of course be playing a supplementary role, by themselves they will be utterly overwhelmed by the scale of what confronts them, just as the RUC was overwhelmed by the rioting in Belfast and Derry in the summer of 1969.

According to standard counter-insurgency doctrine (which seems to derive substantially from British military experience around the world), there should be one soldier or policeman on the ground for every fifty people in the population throughout which the insurgency is taking place. The population of Northern Ireland during the Troubles was about 1.5 million, a number which necessitated 30,000 troops and/or police. At the height of the violence in the early 1970s, 21,000 soldiers of the regular army were deployed in Northern Ireland. They were supplemented by the RUC, which had 8,500 members at its peak and a reserve of 4,500, and the UDR, whose strength grew from about 1,600 in 1970 to 6,000 (3,000 part-time and 3,000 full-time) in 1990. Taken together, these three forces satisfied the 1-to-50 troop-to-population ratio that counter-insurgency doctrine apparently calls for in pacifying an area, during the height of the violence in the early 1970s.

However, the situation is more complex than this summary makes it appear. A tour of duty in NI for a regular army regiment was six months, after which it would be rotated out and to other duties in other parts of the world. This means that each regiment would spend only one fifth of its time in NI. More sustained exposure to counter-insurgency or other high-intensity duties would have placed unsustainable burdens, in terms of morale and psychological strain, on soldiers. What this means is that sustaining 21,000 soldiers in counter-insurgency operations requires 105,000 soldiers in total to be rotated in and out of the insurgency zone as described. The regular army currently has about 106,000 soldiers, which means that a violent conflict across a population of 1.5 million (roughly equivalent to the populations of Birmingham, Bradford, Burnley, and Oldham today) would be the upper boundary to the type of counter-insurgency campaign the regular army could fight, if supplemented à la Troubles by equivalents to the RUC and UDR that allow the 30,000 troop-equivalent figure to be made up. In other words, the current regular army would be at full stretch dealing with the Troubles at their peak.

How do things stand at present? As we have stated, the regular army has 106,000 soldiers. It can, in principle, be supplemented by the 33,000 members of the Territorial Army, and the 134,000 soldiers of the reserve for a total of 273,000 troops. Under standard counter-insurgency calculations as described above, this would allow a counter-insurgency force of 54,600, capable of fighting a standard counter-insurgency in a population of 2.73 million people. Our key assumption in this document (erring on the pessimistic side though it probably is) has been that our government(s) will keep us on a steady course towards Islamization until a crisis occurs. We have argued that this crisis cannot be more than twenty years away, so let us assume that it is exactly twenty years away. The Muslim population of the UK has risen by about 60% in the last ten years, to 2.9 million people. If we extrapolate this growth trend for another twenty years, there will be approximately 7.4 million Muslims in the UK. If we assume that the core conflict zone contains this population and a British population twice as large, then the conflict zone will contain about 22 million people. A counter-insurgency operation fought in this zone would require 440,000 troop-equivalents, which would necessitate a 2.2 million-strong force. We have already shown that the entire British Army, including reservists and the Territorial Army, has only 273,000 troops, almost exactly one eighth of the required number. If we assume that the logistical and psychological advantages of fighting so close to home (i.e. in our home) would allow troops to spend one half of their time in theatre rather one fifth (six month tours of duty alternating with six months elsewhere), then we would still have only 136,500 troop-equivalents out of the desired total of 440,000, or about 31% of the whole.

This line of reasoning makes it clear that a violent conflict spread out through those areas of the UK populated by the 22 million people we mentioned above will massively overwhelm any conceivable efforts of the state to control it. This will not only facilitate the emergence of paramilitaries, it will make their emergence absolutely certain. Indeed, government may accept, legitimise, and cooperate with at least some of the more organized paramilitaries that do emerge in an attempt to retain some influence over them.

Deployment of the British Army

The horrendous difficulties the state will encounter in trying to restore and maintain order notwithstanding, the army is still the only tool it will have at its disposal when it attempts to do so. It therefore behoves us to discuss how it might go about doing so, at least to the extent that it can.

One of the peculiar truths of the Troubles was that the regular Army, certainly from about late 1974 and the start of the PIRA’s temporary ceasefire onwards, saw very little in the way of actual combat with republican paramilitaries. When this year-long ceasefire broke down in early 1976, the war moved quickly from its earlier insurgency phase (during which the PIRA sought to force British forces out of NI outright through relatively open warfare) into its ‘Long War’ phase (during which the PIRA adopted more ‘classic’ terrorist/guerrilla tactics to inflict attrition on British forces over the long term). Engaging in open gun battles with soldiers was no longer a PIRA objective. As a consequence, the duties of regular soldiers now consisted largely of patrolling, manning checkpoints, and standing guard. During the commission of these duties they would occasionally be attacked by bombers, snipers, and the like, but very rarely engage in shooting matches with them. Nearly all of the PIRA volunteers killed by British security forces after this transition were killed by the SAS, 14 Intelligence Company (of whom more later), or the RUC.

In essence, the main role of the regular army was to deny the PIRA the ability to move and operate with ease and impunity. Taking the fight back to them was something that required the unique abilities of special forces and proactive intelligence-gathering services: to carry out surveillance in republican areas (14 Intelligence Company’s speciality), to bug houses of known republicans, to stage ambushes when intelligence of forthcoming attacks was available (most notoriously at Loughgall in 1987, when the SAS shot dead eight PIRA men), to stake out weapons caches, and to capture or kill terrorists who went to retrieve weapons from them. Broadly speaking, we expect a similar pattern to emerge with respect to the deployment of army units during our Muslim Troubles, with the regular army used to patrol and man checkpoints, and with special forces used to conduct intelligence-led surveillance and armed operations.

Regular Army

Army patrols and checkpoints will be located and conducted, of necessity, in urban areas with large Muslim populations. Muslims being what they are, this will undoubtedly be seen as a war against all Muslims, the army laying siege to Muslims, an attempt to exterminate Muslims, or some combination thereof. In contrast, relations between the army and the British public must be expected to be largely peaceful. No conceivable British paramilitary would take the targeting of the army as an objective, not only, or even primarily, because it would be strategically idiotic, but because they will simply not countenance inflicting casualties on it. This does not mean that there will be no expressions of anger or frustration in the streets about actions the army might take, but that they are unlikely to turn to violence in either direction.

To the extent that the regular army comes into violent conflict with either side, it is overwhelmingly likely that it will be with the Muslims, who will probably take to the streets to confront the army quite quickly, rioting, burning, and, as the conflict progresses, shooting and bombing as well when they can. Given the opinions that those in the British Army are likely to have of Muslims in general, and given the violence and hostility they are certain to experience from Muslims, they are unlikely to interact smoothly with them even in the absence of violence. Irrespective of the multicultural guff that senior figures in the army will undoubtedly be spouting, the sympathies of the troops and junior officers will, of course, lie entirely with their own people, and their hatred of Muslims will grow by the day.

British soldiers on the ground in Northern Ireland, after the honeymoon period between them and the Catholic population ended in the spring and summer of 1970, developed a fierce hostility towards the nationalist population of NI that was returned in spades. If this was true during the Troubles, how much truer will it be during our Muslim Troubles? All of the hard fighting that the British Army has taken part in in the last twenty years has taken place against Muslims. There is an entire generation of young soldiers coming through who have never fought anyone else, and who will be painfully well aware of the fact that the Muslim ‘Britons’ they face on the streets would have been at best ambivalent about, and at worst psychologically on the other side during, those conflicts. The hostility shown returning British soldiers on the streets of the UK will not be quickly forgotten.

The likelihood of collusion between elements within the British Army and British paramilitaries is so high as to be a virtual certainty. Collusion can mean many things, and operate at many levels, but the illicit supply of weapons, ammunition, equipment, and intelligence to British paramilitaries by troops on the ground is a sure thing, and something that it will be impossible for more senior officers to clamp down on even if they want to, which is by no means a certainty itself.

More generally, the numerical inadequacy of the British Army relative to the size of the task confronting it (even in the most optimistic scenario) will force it to deploy at only a small fraction of the locations it would otherwise like to. Zone C will be written off by the army early on, if they pay any attention to it at all, and the army presence in much of Zone B will probably be marginal. Only Zone A, in the Greater London area, the West Midlands, and the north-west of England, is likely to see troop numbers even roughly proportional to the scale of the problem. This will have great significance for the British paramilitary core objective of geographical consolidation we discussed earlier. Whether or not British paramilitaries can push Muslims from Zone B to Zone A is one of the great unpredictables of the conflict. If the British Army is largely restricted to operating in Zone A, this objective is probably attainable, and the state may well be forced to facilitate the process to reduce the violence used to bring it about. If the army can maintain a presence in Zone B, then events will be much harder to predict.

Special Forces

There were two main units of special forces used in the Troubles, as we have already noted: the SAS, and 14 Intelligence Company. The SAS was used against republican paramilitaries on intelligence-led missions that required relatively small numbers of men to operate under difficult or unusually demanding circumstances. Reading about the Troubles leaves one with few illusions in this regard: when it comes to lying, soaking wet, in a field for days on end waiting to shoot an IRA man, the SAS have few equals. More interesting though, from our point of view is 14 Intelligence Company, which was just as crucial to the fight against the IRA, albeit in a very different way.

During the early years of the Troubles, army attempts to gather intelligence in republican areas were a fairly hit and miss affair. The need to put matters on a more rigorous footing led to the creation of an undercover army company trained specifically for the task of putting under surveillance republican paramilitary members in nationalist areas of NI where uniformed soldiers and policemen could not operate. This company, 14 Intelligence Company (also known, and subsequently referred to here, as the Det) was to prove its effectiveness time and time again. However, there will be no equivalent in our Muslim Troubles, a point the explication of which will shed some light on the nature of the conflict that awaits us.

One of the most intriguing details regarding the training regime of the Det is that which pertains to their training in the Ulster Irish accent. Though the Det recruited widely across the whole of the armed services, its recruits were mainly from outside of Northern Ireland, and this of course was clear from their accents. As such, they had attain at least some ability to pass themselves off as being men (or women) of Ulster, but it is hard to believe that many of them were particularly accomplished in this regard. Insofar as one can discern from reading about their exploits, most appear to have limited themselves to a few grunts when some sort of response was absolutely called for, as being identified as an Englishman with a gun in a republican area was a good way to end up in a ditch in South Armagh a day later, bound, gagged and shot through the head.

This was a surmountable operational difficulty presented by the linguistic differences between people who were visually indistinguishable. But when we consider the nature of our Muslim Troubles, we see immediately that operating undercover in this fashion is not going to be possible to any significant extent. Nearly all of the Muslims in the UK are something other than white, and nearly everyone in the British army is white. This means that putting together a Det-style army unit to go and prowl around in Muslim areas will be impossible, as there will be no significant pool of suitable people in the army to recruit from for the purpose. It will surely not be beyond the ken of Muslims to see that mysterious white converts to Islam who start coming into their areas may not be exactly what they seem. This is what we will call the mutual impermeability problem, a problem which will bedevil the efforts of all parties to the conflict one way or another. It will be one of the biggest and most significant differences between the Troubles and our forthcoming Muslim Troubles.

Let us explore this point a little further. During the Troubles, it was impossible to tell who was on which side simply by looking at them, which is to say that the parties to the conflict suffered from the mutual permeability problem. This problem, the mirror image of the mutual impermeability problem, sometimes had remarkable consequences. Loyalist hit squads targeting republican paramilitaries would take over houses in nationalist areas and tell the occupants that they were the IRA to gain their cooperation. Johnny ‘Mad Dog’ Adair of the UDA would go jogging in nationalist areas to gather intelligence until his personal notoriety reached such levels as to make this impossible. IRA members would take workmen off a bus and have to ask who the Catholics were and who the Protestants were before opening fire. INLA members could walk into a Protestant pub, plant a bomb, and walk out again. The Shankill Butchers would pick up victims in Catholic areas of Belfast only, as they had no other way of identifying them. A great deal of the violence during the Troubles, and the way it was carried out, only makes sense if one bears in mind the mutual permeability problem.

In contrast, the protagonists to our Muslim Troubles will suffer, as we have said, from the mutual impermeability problem. As such, we can be sure that one of the most effective weapons against the PIRA will not be available in the army’s attempts to reconnoitre Muslim areas and put Muslim paramilitaries under surveillance. This will increase the dependence of the army and security services on informers within those communities and the use of technical and electronic surveillance, all of which have their own drawbacks.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *

After the descent into violent conflict, there will be vast swathes of the country that have no unusual military presence at all, and that will be free zones for British paramilitaries to move, train, and organize as they deem appropriate. Only ‘normal’ police attention will be brought to bear on them. This will allow these areas to play a role similar to the one which the Republic of Ireland played for the PIRA during the Troubles, allowing them to operate with a minimum of scrutiny. Of course, the RUC could not operate at all in the Republic, and it was difficult if not impossible for the British government to have terrorist suspects extradited to the UK, two advantages that British paramilitaries will not have during the conflict in their own hinterlands. Nonetheless, they will still enjoy huge freedom of movement and action in this area, and the police will find it very difficult indeed to disrupt it. The more vicious the conflict becomes, the less willingness there will be a) on the part of local people to report suspicious events, and b) on the part of the British police to act against British paramilitaries anyway.

A key difference between the Troubles and our Muslim Troubles is that there will be no hinterlands, no rural areas, in which Muslims can operate with a minimum of attention being paid to them. There will certainly be no equivalent of the Bandit Country of South Armagh, which the South Armagh PIRA turned into a virtual no-go zone for the British Army for most of the Troubles, through the attentions of the South Armagh sniper and others. It will be as if every single rural area in NI had been utterly dominated by loyalist populations and paramilitaries, republicans had been entirely boxed into ghettoes, there had been no Republic of Ireland to act as training ground or sanctuary, and republicans would have been immediately identifiable as such if they were so foolish as to venture out into the countryside to try and test a bomb. This will be quite a disadvantage for Muslim paramilitaries, to put it mildly.

Coming up:

Part V: A Discredited State


Notes:

11.We ignore here the possibility of collusion between security services and British paramilitaries, which could, in principle, result in those paramilitaries being able to target specific Muslims to a much greater extent.

Previous posts by El Inglés:

2007 Nov 28 The Danish Civil War
2008 Apr 24 Surrender, Genocide… or What?
  May 17 Sliding Into Irrelevance
  Jul 5 A Crystal Ball for Britain: Part 1
    6 A Crystal Ball for Britain: Part 2
    8 A Crystal Ball for Britain: Part 3
  Aug 25 Identity, Immigration, and Islam
  Oct 4 The Blackhoods of Antifa
    26 Racists ’R’ Us
  Nov 25 Surrender, Genocide… or What? — An Update
2009 Feb 16 Pick a Tribe, Any Tribe
  Apr 11 Pick A Tribe, Any Tribe — Part II
  May 18 To Push or to Squeeze?
  Nov 2 On the Failure of Law Enforcement — Part 1
  Dec 5 On the Failure of Law Enforcement — Part 2
    7 On the Failure of Law Enforcement — Part 3
2010 Mar 25 The Death of Democracy
    25 Some Fallacies On the Subject of Crime — Part 1
    28 Reflections on the Civil War in Britain
  Apr 1 A Consideration of the Criminal Investigation Process — Part One
    2 A Consideration of the Criminal Investigation Process — Part Two
    5 On Vigilantism — Part One
  Oct 29 Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 1
  Nov 1 Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 2
    4 Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 3
    2 Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 4
2011 Mar 10 Muslim Immigration into the UK: Part One
    11 Muslim Immigration into the UK: Part Two
    12 Muslim Immigration into the UK: Part Three
    13 Muslim Immigration into the UK: Part Four
  May 25 Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland — Part One: The Idiot Paradigm
    26 Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland — Part Two: The Chocolate Cake Diet
    27 Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland — Part Three: An Explosive Situation

27 comments:

randian said...

I'm not so sure that moving Muslims from Zone B to Zone A will be all that difficult. It is part of Islam's DNA to create monocultural regions, and I believe the natural Muslim instinct in times of conflict will be to congregate even closer together. By the time they realize the strategic error of this thinking they will be have made themselves easy targets.

Note also that Muslims have made a further strategic error: they control no coasts or seaports and have no means of running a naval blockade to resupply. Deprivation of every kind will be easy to inflict upon them since we control the flow of all goods coming into the country, including vital food supplies. They will of course try to smuggle supplies in, and will be aided by the usual useful idiots, but such supply lines will be ruthlessly dealt with by the paramilitaries.

I think you have underestimated how badly political correctness infects the British military and its leadership. It is entirely possible they will end up protecting (as good dhimmis) the major Islamic populations in the big cities rather than aiding the paramilitaries in fighting them. That will certainly be their first set of orders.

Sagunto said...

Thnx EI, for another great installment in this series.

Some preliminary remarks:

Ad 1, Geographical Consolidation

Quote:

"If Muslims in Zone C prove resistant to this sort of coercion, then attacks on their homes or persons will likely be resorted to in order to up the stakes."

Yes indeed. And call it old-fashioned, but i.m.o. it is the women who on average will tilt the scales when it comes to moving or staying. Make a woman wanna leave and a man will eventually follow. That makes Muslim women a logical target in these zones. Intimidate, and, if necessary, attack Muslim women (also to be seen as enemy combatants, not civilians) and the relocation effect might prove to be considerably larger.
In the bigger scheme of things, i.e. at the population level, it is the women whose numbers in any given area decide about population size. So therefore, they should be prime targets in any operation directed against Muslims. I realize that this goes against the vision of "liberating" Muslim women from their male oppressors, based on the assumption that the women are the Achilles' heel of Islam, many of them sort of MINO's, but I think that would be a grave mistake to make (like the Sovjets did in the past). Quite the contrary, Muslim women are the cornerstone of Islam. In short: they should be targeted instead of "liberated", if the objective is getting Muslims to move from C to B/A.

Ad 2, Establishment of the Principle of Retaliation

Quote:

"[..] have them understand that every time they kill one British person, they are also killing one or more Muslims. This is no different to what the loyalist paramilitaries were doing during the Troubles when they would kill randomly-selected Catholics."

Granted that this is a historical parallel, pertaining to the ongoing British presence in Northern-Ireland, written from an English perspective, I can't help but having some serious reservations about linking the killing of Muslims to the random killing of Catholic civilians, descriptive though it may be.

to be continued

wildiris said...

Randian, you have already brought up one of the points I was thinking about while reading this latest post, that is, food supplies.

Large urban enclaves would be extremely vulnerable to the cut off of food supplies. Since transportation of such goods to those individual isolated enclaves, would all have to go first through English controlled areas, they would be a very easy target for an outside paramilitary group to go after.

Other easy targets that came to mind for outside paramilitary groups to go after were sewers, water mains, electrical power grids and even trash collection. Disrupting any of these things would very quickly render any urban Muslim enclave unlivable in a far more effective manner than any bombing campaign ever could.

Sagunto said...

Ad 3, Assassination of key Muslims

Perhaps it would be a wise tactic to start with assassinating key Britons first, in order to exert a psychological effect on those likely to use the state apparatus against British civilians. But come the time that key Muslims must be targeted for assassinations, it would be best, in my opinion at least, to leave those empty suit spokespersons who totally depend on the state, well alone. Muslims don't watch these guys to know their place, they watch channels straight from their lands of origin or else some Arabic station (but I'm inferring from the Dutch situation here). I don't have loony Andy in mind (who should be adopted as the mad-dog posterboy of the CJ-initiative), but the Western looking dawah-ists and taqiyya-artists, performing their skills on el Beeb and the rest of the MSM.
Key Muslims, on the other hand, are the Muslims key to the fabric and "cohesion" of their own communities, and those are the relatively unknown local imams. Eliminate those, preferably at the same time in a synchronized attack, and expect a substantial influence on the local communities all over Britain. Other key Muslims when it comes to the in-group impetus for moving out, are Muslim women, as discussed earlier.

Ad 4, Assassination of Key Britons

Again, at first, I'd leave the empty suits and the useful idiots well alone and go after the money trail instead, or if need be, go for the bosses of them journalists and leave those MSM mouth-pieces where they are, below contempt. The welfare state-sponsored, corporatist enterprise of facilitating Islam is feeding from sources that are represented by high ranking executives. Those collaborators and the institutions they represent would feature among the highest on my initial hit-list.

Ad 5, Spectaculars

Car bombings? I share the reservations expressed and like to add, that car bombings might be considered "folklore" by many Muslims, reminding them of home (or Paris). I could be wrong, but I don't think it would be a key device in getting Muslims to move. Large scale arson of whole flats perhaps would (key is preventing local fire brigades to move in). Poisoning the local, i.e. Muslim water/food supply with e.g. reprotoxic compounds might help (in the longer run). All of this is purely speculative of course..

Kind regs from Amsterdam,
Sag.

Sir Henry Morgan said...

Sagunto:

In any existential conflict you have to kill the females. Females are a strategic asset, males are only a tactical asset. It is quite normal to expend tactical assets to protect strategic assets.

Suppose you have one almighty battle ... resulting in only one male survivor and 100 females. you can repopulate at a rate of 100 people the first year plus 150 (Half the babies will be female)the second year etc with a huge increase when the female babies are old enough to breed. Given the exigencies of the situation that will be about 12 or 13 years. you can increase your population exponentially.

However, if you have only one female and 100 males, you can only repopulate at a rate of one baby per year.

The lesson is: if you are in an existential war, kill all the enemy women and the girl children you can get your hands on - make them the actual target, and the tactical assets you kill are just incidental to achieving the strategic aim.

Ruthless? You bet. But it's how we'll win in such a conflict. And if there is none of them left... who's going to make a complaint to the war-crimes tribunal?

Sir Henry Morgan said...

I think I might be well named on the ruthlessness front.

cornholio said...

It seems to me the governments of Western style democracies have been so corrupted by Islamofascism (i.e. bribery) that there's no doubt whose side they will take in any conflict. Maybe civil war is in the future, a civil war in which those who still value their freedom are fighting against a corrupt government trying to force Islamofascism on all of them.

Sagunto said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
Sagunto said...

Sir Henry -

You are right. That's what I alluded to, when I wrote:

"In the bigger scheme of things, i.e. at the population level, it is the women whose numbers in any given area decide about population size."

Take care,
Sag.

temp_1 said...

I understand, in the UK, a householder cannot kill a burgular if the burgular does not threaten him. Most households lack firearms so a householder would be restricted to cold steel and any violence would be highly personal.
I can imagine a polite burgular breaking in, explaining calmy why he is there. Then proceeding in a civilized fashion to loot the household. I assume the burgular is big and young while the householder is relaively small, middleaged and unaccustomed to confrontation, and certainly not likely to attack, particularly if the burgular is not threatening. How would he explain his action if he did? Surely better to let the TV go than risk being injured.

Exactly the same situation may apply with Muslims. If they don’t attack, but merely demonstrate, complain about all manner of minor matters, make endless small demands, while growing in numbers, what will trigger the confrontation? And who will take it upon himself to start shooting at relatively peaceful Muslims?

Anjem Choudry deserves to be shot and is likely easy to reach but what’s the point? He’s a clown. Better to shot Tariq Ramadan but likely he is under constant survelience hence well protected.

I expect the Muslims know all this well enough. They know we have been trained from birth to be non-violent. It will be difficult for us to change. So, if the Muslim community restrain their violence, as they appear to be doing in Europe in general, we many be taken over slowly and quite peacefully. The last 20 years demonstrates how completely a country can change without causing a complete breakdown into violence and how easily an elected government can facilitate those changes despite the vague wishes of the people.

temp_1 said...

I understand, in the UK, a householder cannot kill a burgular if the burgular does not threaten him. Most households lack firearms so a householder would be restricted to cold steel and any violence would be highly personal.
I can imagine a polite burgular breaking in, explaining calmy why he is there. Then proceeding in a civilized fashion to loot the household. I assume the burgular is big and young while the householder is relaively small, middleaged and unaccustomed to confrontation, and certainly not likely to attack, particularly if the burgular is not threatening. How would he explain his action if he did? Surely better to let the TV go than risk being injured.

Exactly the same situation may apply with Muslims. If they don’t attack, but merely demonstrate, complain about all manner of minor matters, make endless small demands, while growing in numbers, what will trigger the confrontation? And who will take it upon himself to start shooting at relatively peaceful Muslims?

Anjem Choudry deserves to be shot and is likely easy to reach but what’s the point? He’s a clown. Better to shot Tariq Ramadan but likely he is under constant survelience hence well protected.

I expect the Muslims know all this well enough. They know we have been trained from birth to be non-violent. It will be difficult for us to change. So, if the Muslim community restrain their violence, as they appear to be doing in Europe in general, we many be taken over slowly and quite peacefully. The last 20 years demonstrates how completely a country can change without causing a complete breakdown into violence and how easily an elected government can facilitate those changes despite the vague wishes of the people.

One_of_the_last_few_Patriots_left said...

One thing that has always puzzled me is why the Brits put up with all of those goddamned CCTV cameras.

As El Ingles points out, British paramilitaries will largely operate in rural areas..."with low concentrations of CCTV cameras and other elements of the surveillance state."

Ha, ha... and when the Troubles become widespread and the normal rules of polite behavior go out the window and many more people have rifles... I predict that many of these CCTV cameras will provide us with some fun TARGET PRACTICE.

an EDL buck said...

@ sagunto
There are SO many things wrong with your comments! REAL ENGLISH MEN DO NOT HURT WOMEN! Fullstop! (or period as the Americans say). However the men are fair game!
*Blows the call to the hunt on a bugle*



@ Sir 'enry
What your proposing is to sink to the level of the koranimal! Grow up and learn to think, we must, (publically), be better than our enemy.

Sir Henry Morgan said...

I'm not claiming to be nice - just to know what is required to WIN.

And ... I'm not English.

No good being the rightest corpse in the graveyard.

Sir Henry Morgan said...

No one ever won an existential conflict by being nicer than the enemy. I include WW2.

Sagunto said...

an EDL buck -

You wrote:

"There are SO many things wrong with your comments! REAL ENGLISH MEN DO NOT HURT WOMEN! Fullstop!"

While I value your critique, I wonder why you only mention one of the allegedly "many things" wrong with my comments, especially because it is the one thing that stands to reason among my other contentions that are all debatable.

And please note that I was speaking of targeting Muslim women in the context of getting Muslims to move from C to B/A areas. Furthermore, I wonder what is wrong with the assertion that the number of women in a given area are a crucial factor for population size in the long run.

You might also have noticed that I consider all Muslims, including Muslim women, to be enemy combatants when it comes to civil war.
It is without question that your refusal to adopt this view will be exploited as a weakness by Muslim jihadis. They already have switched to the tactic of gracing their female combatants with fashionably explosive "accessories".

Kind regs from Amsterdam,
Sag.

Sir Henry Morgan said...

Female muslims ARE combatants - their weapon of choice is their bellies.

Van Grungy said...

http://jm.bahai.org/

in the meanwhile, the mahdi continues to make inroads..

Hesperado said...

One crucial factor which El Ingles and all the commenters seem to be neglecting is that currently, and for the foreseeable future, Muslims within the West are not all Orientals with strange garb inhabiting only self-segregating ghettos. Sure many of them may be that way, but we would be recklessly remiss to ignore innumerable other Muslims throughout the West who have been given access to all our institutions -- from academic, to educational, to medical (hospitals, clinics, labs), to news media, to business, to politics, to police forces, to firefighters, to various parts of the military, as well as to lowlier jobs like taxi drivers or menial work -- and exemplifying a social stratification ranging all the way from upper level positions all the way down to custodians and eveything in between.

Of course, perhaps the majority (over 50%) of Muslim subpopulations in Europe represent the stereotype indulged by El Ingles and the commenters here; however, the other types of Muslims I mention here are crucial because they have been given access to vulnerable areas.

Should Muslims decide to move from phase A to B, they will already have innumerable Muslims (many of them quite "respectable", even wearing distinguished three-piece suits with wives who wear no hijab) capable – and sufficiently fanatical -- of planting bombs (of various kinds), or biological or chemical toxins, or any number of other mass-murderous techniques our limited imaginations haven't conceived yet -- and I doubt that Western societies will anticipate this by moving to our own phase B first, in order to pre-empt Muslims in this regard.

syntec said...

"One crucial factor which El Ingles and all the commenters seem to be neglecting is that currently, and for the foreseeable future, Muslims within the West are not all Orientals with strange garb inhabiting only self-segregating ghettos. Sure many of them may be that way, but we would be recklessly remiss to ignore innumerable other Muslims throughout the West who have been given access to all our institutions -- from academic, to educational, to medical (hospitals, clinics, labs), to news media, to business, to politics, to police forces, to firefighters, to various parts of the military, as well as to lowlier jobs like taxi drivers or menial work -- and exemplifying a social stratification ranging all the way from upper level positions all the way down to custodians and eveything in between."

Quite!

Personally, I tend to envisage a situation where sizeable elements of non-Muslim non-Whites along with traitorous indigenous White sympathizers and converts of/to all things non-White and alien, shall also join forces against the indigenous peoples of the UK and Europe.

This inevitability will call for careful planning and the implementation of cunning/ruthless strategy on the part of the hierarchies of the patriotic members of indigenous European and British populations, before the onset of direct confrontation.

Once again, regarding the presence of the fox in the hen house, ie, Muslims enabled within the framework of our respective across-the-board infrastructures, such infrastructures will self-destruct due to the collapse of the financial framework(s) supporting them and will quickly cease to wield any power or influence over the dissenting indigenous masses at all.

I would imagine that the said enabled Muslim infiltrators will even end up in danger of losing their lives at the hands of the indigenous too.

Sir Henry Morgan said...

Hesperado:

WE Europeans have form in these situations. Do you think you'll never see another Inquisition?

I swear, if I'm still alive at the end of this business, I'll face a war crimes tribunal. But I'm quite old - nearly 60 - already. But even someone extremely codger can still sit in a hole and shoot everything in front of him. And someone's got to be psychologically
prepared to deal with the strategic target.

Hesperado said...

Sir Henry Morgan,

I hope we do see another Inquisition -- i.e., a process like the original one, of ferreting out stealth Muslims and their enablers after we have expelled all the visible Muslims.

Sir Henry Morgan said...

Hesperado

I knew exactly what the real Inquisition was before I wrote that. And that's what I meant - information obtained under torture is always unreliable: s prisoner will say anything to make the pain stop.

Good to see I'm not the only one who knows these things, Just because I'm psychologiclly hard (the only hardness that matters) doesn't mean I'm stupid.

I too would say anything to make the pain stop.

Hesperado said...

Sir Henry Morgan,

Actually, from what I understand, the Inquisition was one of the most rational and comparatively least violent forensic/investigative/judicial process of the period. It seems that concerning just about anything in Western history, one has to wade through a lot of PC MC revisionist crap to get back to the truth.

Sagunto said...

SHM,

One of the manifold popular myths.. (like the "Dark Middle Ages" or "the Church as the great obstacle to science", etc..) the infamous Inquisition, burning large numbers of what have you deviants in public autos-da-fé..

Whereas in fact, Spanish inquisitors rarely burned anyone, and the typical punishment they meted out was rather mild. For those convicted of witchcraft, in Spain it usually sufficed to say they were sorry.

Reading tip: Henry Kamen: "The Spanish Inquisition" (1997 edition).

Hesperado said...

Yes Sagunto.

And one of the main (and only relevant for us) activities of the Inquisition was in ferretting out Muslim double agents and their enablers. Not appreciably different from what we had to do with Nazi or Communist spies -- except that Spain had just recovered their land after some 800 years of the enemy brutally occupying it and continually attacking Europe outside of Spain during that time (and after). Really, to impugn the Spanish Inquisition is the height of idiocy. After a mere decade or so of German atrocities and occupation, the classically liberal Czechs rounded up and expelled over 3 million Germans (many of them Czech citizens); the Spanish had 800 [expletive deleted that has to do with one's female parent and a vulgar term for the biological act of reproduction] years of suffering under Islamic rule, for Christ's sake. Under those circumstances, the Inquisition was mild.

Green Infidel said...

Sir Hennry Morgan, re your no. 5...

Just one small problem with your idea of "ruthlessness with enemy women" - is it us being ruthless in this regard, or the enemy? Because as far as I can see, our enemies are targetting as many non-Muslim women as possible - either for marriage (ie more of their kids, less of ours), prostitution (meaning those women probably won't have any kids - and if they do, there probably won't be a father willing to bring them up) or violent assault (quite a few documented cases).

Meanwhile, the Muslim women are hidden inside their "tents" (or "trash bags" - whichever you prefer), and inside their houses... out of sight, and out of danger?

I've heard it said that in Spain during the time of the Reconquista, the Christians were only able to attack freely when their women were "safely deep inside their territory"...

Meanwhile - Osama bin Laden said "security is a very important thing in life"...

So, could the Muslims be playing exactly this game - striking at their enemy's "strategic assets" (women) and making their enemies expend more of their efforts defending those women - while keeping their women "safe" at home - to be dependable incubators for future generations of the Jihad?