To Push or to Squeeze?

Here is another in an occasional series from El Ingles. As readers familiar with our essayist know by now, Señor Ingles doesn’t pull his punches.

I will reiterate again (for all the good it seems to do) that this essay, like his others, is descriptive; it is not normative. We have become so bullied by the censorious politically correct language police that we are no longer able to differentiate between the two kinds of rhetoric. Like children, we conflate description with reality, as if by imagining what might occur, we magically make it happen by speaking.

That kind of thinking is regessive to an earlier period of human development when words had magic and could cause events all by themselves.

To the grown-ups: enjoy!

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Introduction
Being of a sinister disposition, I have continued to ruminate upon the likely course of events as relations between European countries and their Muslim fifth columns unravel. In particular, I would like to focus on the probable nature of attempts on the part of native populations to bring about what is euphemistically referred to as the repatriation of their Muslim populations.

To recap briefly, in ‘Surrender, Genocide or What?’ (hereafter referred to as SGW), I suggested that there were three basic ways in which the number of Muslims in any given European country could, in principle, be reduced:

• through pressuring them, in whatever fashion, to decide to relocate (Option 1);
  
• through deporting them (Option 2); and,
  
• through large-scale violence which, taken to an extreme, would constitute genocide (Option 3).

I further suggested that certain dynamics long at work in the countries in question had already significantly reduced the likelihood of being able to deal with the problem of Islam through Options 1 and 2 alone. In short, I saw a clear progression of violence and unpleasantness from Option 1 to Option 2 to Option 3, a slippery slope from one to the next, down which European natives were destined to slide, like it or not, as they fought back against Islam and the entire process of Islamization.

The above notwithstanding, it occurs to me of late that these three options may not in fact mark out a linear progression on the road from less to more ruthless de-Islamization tactics. Rather, they can better be considered to represent the three corners of an equilateral triangle, within which a given set of policies can be represented by a point, and each option a corner.

The proximity of the point to each corner indicates the fraction of the relevant option in a given set of responses. If we assume that European peoples start their de-Islamization efforts at a point very close to the corner representing Option 1, then it is far from clear that the course taken by that point as the situation disintegrates need veer off towards Option 2 before heading for Option 3. Indeed, there is no reason in principle why de-Islamization efforts cannot move directly from Option 1 towards Option 3, skirting widely around Option 2. In this essay, I will argue that this is, in fact, what is likely to happen.

As a preliminary to this discussion, I will consider in more detail what it would mean to implement Option 1, especially in light of recent developments in Europe. I will then reexamine certain issues I first brought up in SGW to explain why I am now convinced that Option 2 will never play a central role in de-Islamization efforts. Finally, I will consider what an escalation of the conflict between natives and Muslims in Europe would consist of in the absence of Option 2, how it might come to pass that Option 3 would be gradually incorporated into de-Islamization efforts, and how Option 3 might eventually render itself unnecessary.
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Towards Option 1
It is heartening to observe that politically-aware people in European nations are waking up, however slowly, to the catastrophe that Muslim immigration is busy shaping for them. As a direct consequence of this awakening there are prominent political figures in at least some European countries who have started to advocate what would be considered, in my scheme, Option 1, mixed with small amounts of Option 2. The most illustrative example is to be found in the Netherlands.

I consider the Dutch instance to be the purest, and conceptually the neatest, example of a move towards Option 1 and what may lie beyond it. The situation in the Netherlands possesses certain characteristics that allow for clarity and greatly sharpen our understanding of what is happening. In Geert Wilders it has as its figurehead a charismatic and striking politician with an incisive and unapologetic approach to divisive issues. Support for his party, the Freedom Party, has been growing rapidly, and has already reached a level which would make it the largest in the Dutch Parliament if elections were to be held today. Furthermore, Wilders has been extremely successful in building up a strong international profile in recent months, with a little help from the witless fools in the British Home Office.

Needless to say, it is hardly a certainty that Wilders will be Prime Minister any time soon, and far from clear that any coalition government he might be able to form in the future would actually afford him the freedom of manoeuvre he would presumably desire. However, there is clearly a considerable degree of momentum being established in the Netherlands with respect to the incorporation into government policy of many of the key ideas of those who are serious about opposing Islamization.

I will be more specific. In an April 2009 speech given in Florida, Wilders listed a number of measures that he felt should be introduced to oppose and reverse the Islamization of European countries. They included the following:

• Official recognition of Islam as a political ideology, not a religion, and the concomitant removal of all protections afforded it as a religion.
  
• The immediate cessation of all Muslim immigration.
  
• The encouraging of voluntary repatriation.
  
• The expulsion of foreign criminals, including Dutch citizens with dual nationality.
  
• The cessation of new mosque-building.
  
• The closing down of mosques in which incitement to violence has taken place.
  
• The closing down of Muslim schools.

Were such a program actually to be implemented, it is fairly clear that the Netherlands would have heartily adopted Option 1, supplemented with Option 2. What this means is that one of the European countries worst afflicted by the cancer of Islam is already at a point where the debate on what would constitute a genuinely effective response to Islam is moving into the political mainstream, pushed by a political party whose popularity is fast increasing and likely to increase a good deal more. Indeed, it is not inconceivable that within the next few years the Netherlands could be attempting to implement at least some elements of the first de-Islamization program in modern European history.

This is where we currently stand. Personally, I am both surprised and delighted that the situation vis-à-vis Islam is unraveling so quickly, in the Netherlands and elsewhere. I am also extremely heartened to note that a certain phenomenon that I wrote about in my essay, Pick a Tribe, Any Tribe, (Parts 1 and 2) is also starting to become visible in the Netherlands, to wit, the reemergence of tribalism in policy proposals. More specifically, I refer to Wilders’ suggestion that criminal immigrants should be deported. If my interpretation of this proposal is correct, then its importance cannot be overstated. Superficially nothing more than a robust response to imported violence and dysfunctionality, it in fact constitutes nothing less than a fundamental redefinition of what it means to be Dutch.

If a second-generation Moroccan living in the Netherlands could be deported upon obtaining a criminal record and an equally criminal native Dutch person could not, then the Netherlands would already have become a two-tier society, in which native Dutch people had legal rights that immigrants, of whatever generation, did not. Non-native Dutch people would know that their time in the Netherlands was something that could be brought to a halt at any time if they strayed too far beyond the law, provided they had dual citizenship or originated from a country that granted the right of return to anyone who could trace their roots to it.

When the members of a group can have their citizenship revoked, their citizenship has, in a sense, already been revoked. That is, they exist in a different legal category to that of the majority population of the country in question. This is a big step. Though Wilders has yet to formulate it in these terms, there appears to be a nativism, that is to say a tribalism, in his proposals that can only continue to reemerge throughout Europe in response to the threat of Islam.

Option 2 Denied?
Having now reminded readers of the details of Option 1, I must also remind them that, in SGW, I concluded that Option 1 would almost certainly be incapable of de-Islamizing a country. I do not plan to revisit that argument here; rather, I will simply assume that Option 1 has now been implemented in a hypothetical country without either breaking the will of the Muslim population or inducing a non-electoral discontinuity.

Now I will explore the question of what comes next, by returning to part of the discussion in SGW, which focused on the difficulties involved in deporting large numbers of Muslims from European countries, i.e., the problems inherent in the implementation of Option 2.

It needs to be stated in no uncertain terms that there is no point in attempting to implement Option 2 if in doing so, one collapses an electoral discontinuity into a non-electoral discontinuity. At that point Option 2 would no longer exist in any meaningful sense. Beyond a non-electoral discontinuity, there are very few ‘options’ at all in the sense that we would normally understand the term. Avoiding non-electoral discontinuity should therefore be a key objective of those who seek to de-Islamize their countries with as little human suffering as possible. Sadly, it seems clear that if the Muslim population of a given country increased so greatly that natives begin considering the draconian de-Islamization efforts which make up Option 2, then it will be sufficiently large to collapse any electoral discontinuity into a non-electoral discontinuity if it so desires. As I put it in SGW:

I am aware of no examples of large-scale deportations being carried out by aircraft, which they would have to be in this case. [...] [I]t must be observed that air travel is the most infrastructurally fragile of all modes of transportation, and completely reliant on the goodwill and cooperation of people at the destination. A functioning government might be able to organize and carry out mass deportations via airline, but would surely be forced to preemptively intern the target population, and the notion that such populations in Europe would allow themselves to be peacefully interned strains credulity to breaking point and beyond. If this is true now, how much truer would it be in five or ten years time? Even the merest suggestion of implementing such a plan would surely collapse an electoral discontinuity into a non-electoral discontinuity for reasons already discussed.

Even if we ignore the vexing question of how Option 2 could be ordered, let alone implemented, without hurling a country into a non-electoral discontinuity, we need to ask a few questions about its utility in comparison with other options, which, as I suggested above, now seem to me to be slightly broader than I had suggested originally in SGW. So let us suspend our disbelief for a moment. Imagine that a hypothetical Wilders government announces that most Muslims and people of Muslim heritage are to be deported from the Netherlands, without the country descending directly into chaos. In this case, we could say with some confidence that many, if not all, of the following consequences would be observed:

1) International Condemnation
The degree, type, and consequences of international condemnation experienced by a Netherlands announcing the deportation of its Muslim population would depend very heavily on the extent to which other European countries were involved in similar activities at the same time. For this reason, it is difficult to even begin to make any predictions as to what the details of the broader international response might be. However, we can reasonably predict that in the absence of a Europe-wide breakdown in relations between Muslims and their host societies, the Netherlands would very quickly become an international pariah state. International organizations such as the UN and EU could well expel it; at least some other European/Western countries would condemn it; the OIC and member states would call for military intervention (presumably by the US!). Many third-party countries without any obvious stake in the struggle would also join in the chorus of disapproval. None of these developments would necessarily prove fatal to Dutch de-Islamization efforts; perhaps not even all of them together could do so. However, the external attacks would be a thorn in the side of those defending the Netherlands from Islam.

2) Severing of Diplomatic Ties and Trade Links
Closely related to the previous concern, this would likely cause greater difficulty for our hypothetical Wilders government. The welfare of Dutch citizens in Muslim countries would be a key concern, and a preemptive withdrawal of diplomatic personnel from the Muslim world would probably be prudent. More problematic still would be the cessation of trade with the Muslim world, which could have an impact not only on Dutch exports, but on supplies of oil and gas. It is also possible that other countries would boycott Dutch produce and refuse to sell their own exports to Dutch companies and consumers.

3) Refusal of Airlines
Given the likelihood of Muslims in the Muslim world deciding that the continued presence of large numbers of their co-religionists in European countries was beneficial, it is quite possible that they would simply refuse to cooperate with any efforts on the part of those countries to deport said Muslims. It would surely be a relatively trivial matter for Morocco to close its airspace to any European airline or aircraft that were participating in the mass deportations of Moroccans from the Netherlands. If formal channels for deportation were to close, it is very difficult to see how Option 2 could proceed at all. Of course, if the Netherlands were to simply start brutalizing its Moroccan population, the attitude of the Moroccan government could change overnight as it realized that maintaining political leverage in the Netherlands through the Moroccan population there was of only secondary importance relative to preventing them from being slaughtered. But here we would already have blundered into Option 3, which is precisely what we are trying to avoid, thus rendering Option 2 irrelevant and/or impossible in any case.

4) Surge in Terrorist Activity
Given the Muslim predilection for terrorism, it is very hard to imagine a scenario in which terrorist activity, successful or not, would not immediately spike as the Muslim population of the Netherlands learns that it is expected to surrender to the unpleasantness of Option 2. Even a single successful attack could, in such a context, result in a rapid escalation of counterattack after counterattack that would render the further implementation of any ordered set of policies impossible, with all that this impossibility implies.

5) Massive Riots
Needless to say, large-scale rioting and the aforementioned surge in terrorist activity constitute the most obvious ways in which an electoral discontinuity would collapse into a non-electoral discontinuity. Even ignoring this possibility the massive damage and destruction - physical, human, and political - caused by rioting is something that Wilders and those like him will be keen to avoid if at all possible. It is hard to see how large-scale and well-organized rioting across urban areas in the Netherlands could be avoided if a future Dutch government were to announce its intention to implement Option 2, and equally hard to see how such rioting could be brought under control once both sides understood that they were involved in an existential struggle.


In addition to these issues, I must reiterate that it is difficult to envisage a scenario in which attempts to implement Option 2 on any large scale did not collapse an electoral discontinuity into a non-electoral one, which would be the gravest problem of all. In addition, there is the more prosaic set of problems presented by the sheer cost and logistical difficulty of trying to deport hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people, many of whom will undoubtedly not go quietly, from a given country by air. As such, I would suggest that it is unclear that any reasonable cost-benefit analysis could indicate that Option 2 were an efficient or effective way of de-Islamizing a country. However, the twin failures of Options 1 and 2 do not in fact mean that a downwards plunge into Option 3 is therefore inevitable. On the contrary, I suspect that something somewhat more refined, and considerably more devious, awaits us.

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Option 1 (Enhanced)
Let us assume once more that Option 1, laced with a small amount of Option 2 (hereafter referred to as Option 1 (Standard)), has now been implemented in some European country, as described above. While it has cut the growth rate of the Muslim population, nonetheless, this has largely failed to solve the problem of Islamization. Let us further assume that the country in question has not descended into anarchy, but that the predictable pushback on the part of Muslims has indeed transpired. Given the higher fertility rates of Muslims, it is clear that much would remain to be done. Here, I propose to consider how Option 1 ([Standard) might gradually be upgraded to Option 1 (Enhanced) by the people and government of a country eager to resolve its Muslim problem permanently.

As a preliminary, let it be said that domestic political and legal challenges to pushback against Islam will be ignored in these considerations since they are too difficult to predict and would be proved irrelevant if the country in question were on the verge of moving beyond Option 1 (Standard).

I have not yet explained what Option 1 (Enhanced) is, so let me do so here: it consists of using far more inconsiderate and uncivilized means to tighten the squeeze on Muslims, including means that are well beyond the pale at present in any polite discussion of the problems resulting from Islamization. Not famed for my politeness, I will suggest that these means would include but not be limited to the following, in order of increasing divergence from the prevailing ideas of what is acceptable in a civilized society:

Draconian Legislation Banning the Hiring of Illegal Immigrants
Hiring illegal immigrants should already be illegal, but introducing and enforcing more draconian legislation aimed at employers who ignore the status of illegal immigrants could have great utility in getting rid of the large numbers of illegal immigrants, many of whom are Muslims. In the UK, there are estimated to be somewhere in the region of 750,000 illegal immigrants. Though hard data is difficult to come by, these illegals are often said to originate in Muslim or predominantly Muslim countries, such as Somalia, Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. Clamping down on illegal immigrants in this fashion would be one of the easiest and politically painless ways of putting the squeeze on Islamisation. Alternatively, a clampdown on illegal immigrants could be announced, with enforcement efforts focusing overwhelmingly on Muslim illegal immigrants to get the message across implicitly.

Reduced Access to Public Services and Quality of Public Infrastructure
This is something that would have to be done gradually to avoid the possibility of being pulled into a non-electoral discontinuity. To understand it, consider the infrastructural elements on which our quality of life so heavily depends: transportation (roads, buses, trams, trains), sanitation (sewers, water supply, garbage removal), communication (mobile phone networks, terrestrial phone networks, broadband connections, mail delivery), health (doctors’ surgeries, hospitals), law enforcement (police patrols, emergency services, arrest and incarceration of criminals), and public support (housing benefit, unemployment benefit). These disparate fibres, which together constitute much of the weave of a modern state, would provide a veritable smorgasbord of opportunities to a government wishing to squeeze Muslims out of its country. Some can simply be denied at the source, such as welfare benefits. Some can be downgraded piecemeal, such as bus and tram services. Others can gradually be observed to disintegrate or suffer from inexplicable problems, as phone lines go dead, garbage removal grinds to a halt, and the local clinic closes for ‘lack of funds.’ Imaginative readers can no doubt offer their own suggestions in this regard.

Refusal of Re-Entry for Muslims
Ignoring the multitude of legal barriers that exist at present, it should be possible in principle to devise a system whereby certain types of immigrants can simply be kept out of the country should they ever leave. One of the ways in which the Americans tightened relevant aspects of their security post-9/11 was to implement pre-flight checking of the personal details of would-be entrants to the US. Anyone not providing their details or providing details that flag them as undesirable is refused boarding at the departure point of their inbound journey. This and other approaches could surely be adapted to the purposes of European countries eager to prevent Muslims from re-entering their countries should they ever leave. Note that the objective of such a measure would not be to spring a surprise on Muslims trying to board aircraft back to Europe in their countries of origin. Rather, it would be to lay down a choice to Muslims still in European countries: either accept that you can never return to your home country, ever, for any reason, or make the decision to go back there now for good. Those Muslims in Europe with strong family and other emotional ties to their home countries would surely feel great pressure as a consequence of such policies.

Assiduous Deportation of Muslim Criminals
Of course, some Muslim criminals are already deported from European countries. Here, however, I refer to the deportation of anyone of Muslim heritage, citizen of their host country or no. It would need to be decided which crimes warranted deportation, and which groups could have their members deported should those members be so foolish as to be convicted of breaking the relevant laws. Once these decisions had been made, however, a significant fraction of the young, male Muslim population of any European country would fairly shortly be available for deportation, especially if relevant new legislation were to be applied retroactively. The ability to break up families and generally destroy the confidence of Muslims in their status in European countries would be at least as significant as the actual deportations. Additionally, the Muslim unrest that would undoubtedly result from any such large-scale deportations would provide a fresh stream of ‘volunteers’ to be deported, making it a potentially very potent weapon in the hands of committed de-Islamizers.

Violent Attacks by Non-State Actors
Just as the previous option essentially introduces elements of Option 2 into Option 1, deporting Muslim criminals would do the same, but with elements of Option 3. It does not require a great degree of foresight to see that ever more organized forms of violence may well come to be used by Muslims and natives against each other as the tensions between them increase. However, in the context of the ever-tightening squeeze that is Option 1 (Enhanced), such violence, directed at Muslim populations throughout a given country, would also constitute a fairly obvious squeeze factor. This will not be lost upon those non-state groups interested in seeing the influence of Islam in their countries undergo a steep decline. The possibility of elements in the police and/or intelligence services providing equipment, training, or intelligence to these groups is an intriguing one. That said, however, this course of action differs from the other four in that it is not undertaken by the apparatus of state, and is therefore part of Option 1 (Enhanced). That is, it would be more likely to occur after the situation has degenerated far enough to make this option viable, but not in the sense that it is something that the authorities would intentionally or overtly implement. To be completely clear, Option 1 (Enhanced) does not include the possibility of the government of a country engaging directly in large-scale, lethal violence against Muslim populations. It is very hard to see what advantage this would have, politically speaking, over arming and turning a blind eye to informal militias. As such, I dismiss it here and do not propose to analyze it further in this context.


Having introduced the most obvious ways in which Option 1 (Standard) could be upgraded to Option 1 (Enhanced), it is necessary to point out those elements that are likely to make the latter a more attractive option than Option 2 for the purposes of de-Islamization. These are several: its diffuse nature, its deniability, and its incrementality. I will touch upon each of these in turn.

Diffuse Nature
Opposition to a given political scheme of whatever sort will always be easier to organize if the scheme itself is clear-cut, easy to identify, and easy to analyze. Option 1 (Enhanced), coming as it would on top of Option 1 (Standard), would consist of a large number of different initiatives whose variety would make it difficult for opponents to organize any coherent response. Furthermore, there is no need for decision-makers to present these initiatives as being a unified suite of policies. At least some aspects of Option 1 (Enhanced) would be introduced with virtually no public discussion at all. The potential exists to imbue large chunks of Option 1 (Enhanced) with, shall we say, a reduced radar signature, making them difficult targets for those who oppose these strategies.

Deniability
Deniability is related to and, at least in part, stems from the diffuse nature of Option 1 (Enhanced) as outlined above. How troubling that Muslim areas should find their electricity supply cutting out in the middle of the day for no discernible reason! How irksome that the perpetrators of mosque bombings and arson attacks should prove so difficult to bring to justice! What a coincidence that all the illegal immigrants being arrested and deported by immigration authorities should happen to be Muslims! And what a shame that it should be necessary to deport thousands of young Muslim criminals, thus breaking up family ties. However, we must have law and order, we simply must. Option 1 (Enhanced) could, not completely but substantially, be presented as something other than what it actually is. Of course, no one with any spare brain capacity at all will be fooled by this smokescreen should Option 1 (Enhanced) ever come to be implemented in any European country. But sometimes keeping up appearances is a good tactic to employ against the aggrieved.

Incrementality
Most importantly of all, Option 1 (Enhanced) has the advantage of incrementality, which is to say that the degree of pressure exerted on Muslims can be varied arbitrarily to take any value at all. This is in stark contrast with Option 2, which would represent such a massive rupture with the past that it would almost certainly break a country in two, or, to rephrase, result in a non-electoral discontinuity. To demonstrate the point, let us contrast moderate and draconian implementations of Option 1 (Enhanced), in the context of the UK.

In the moderate implementation: 1) those hiring illegal immigrants would be punishable by a fine of up to £5,000; 2) road maintenance and street cleaning would be deprioritized in Muslim areas, and diversion of county and national tax revenues to make up for the weak tax base in these areas would cease; 3) Muslim residents of the UK without British citizenship would be refused re-entry to the UK if there were suspicion of their involvement in terrorist/jihadist activity; 4) authorities would turn a blind eye to attacks on mosques, or on Muslims in general; 5) anyone of Muslim heritage convicted of a violent or sexual crime would be deported, without the right of appeal, to their country of origin.

In the severe implementation: 1) those hiring illegal immigrants would be punishable by a fine of up to £100,000 and/or five years in prison; 2) Muslims would lose access to free healthcare and see welfare benefits cut in half, and Muslim areas would see garbage removal drop off to once a month, as electricity supply and mobile phone coverage were gradually cut back; 3) all Muslims not British citizens would be flatly denied entry/re-entry to the UK; 4) native militias would conduct mosque bombings, targeted killings, and arson attacks against Muslim targets throughout country, with police and intelligence services turning a blind eye, when not actively aiding and abetting; 5) anyone of Muslim heritage convicted of any crime at all would be deported, without the right of appeal, to their country of origin.

These two examples demonstrate the huge scope for squeezing Muslims within the confines of Option 1 (Enhanced). The ability to apply pressure gradually in this fashion, incrementally tightening the vise, would be one of the advantages of this option, which creates no sudden flashpoint likely to induce disintegration as per Option 2.


Of the five negative responses to Option 2 I listed above (international condemnation, severing of diplomatic ties and trade links, refusal of airlines, surge in terrorist activity, and massive riots) at least the first three could be forestalled, reduced, or delayed by progressing to Option 1 (Enhanced) rather than going to Option 2 should Option 1 (Standard) be tried and found wanting. This is no small advantage, especially given the greater likelihood of Option 2 inducing a non-electoral discontinuity.

From Option 1 to Option 3 and Back Again
It will not have escaped readers’ attention that Option 1 (Enhanced) starts off nasty and gets worse. Accordingly, it is unlikely to take place without considerable upheaval, and some of its measures and the aftermath of those measures may be better categorized under Option 3 rather than including them in any version of Option 1. Note that there is no point at which the former replaces the latter. Options 1, 2, and 3 are, after all, nothing more than a conceptual framework introduced to facilitate a more rigorous analysis of the constituent properties of de-Islamization. These are not an explicit menu of mutually exclusive options that would be individually chosen in any conscious fashion.

There is a point beyond which any analytical framework contrived to deal with subject matter as complex as the de-Islamization of Europe will break down, and ad hoc argument becomes as effective as more rigorous alternatives.

The framework I have established here has now reached that point. Thus, I will make the observation hinted at already i.e., all de-Islamization measures undertaken under Options 2 and 3 could also be considered to fall under Option 1. If two thousand unfortunate Muslims were to be killed in Birmingham, would that not induce many others to consider booking flights back to Islamabad, Dhaka, or Mogadishu? If this is the case, then how can Option 1 and Option 3 be considered discrete, separate alternatives?

This is not a paradox I want to resolve here. Rather, I will suggest that if discontinuity is reached while European natives are still majorities in their own countries, any large-scale violent conflict between Muslims and those natives will quickly work to the advantage of the latter. Any violence that could be categorized as Option 3 (under my existing taxonomy of de-Islamization) combined with the other provisions of Option 1 that would already be in place, would have such a drastic effect on Muslim populations that de-Islamization could be completed almost entirely within the confines of Option 1.

It is hard to envisage de-Islamization taking place without at least some outbreaks of mob violence and the temporary breakdown of law and order across swathes of urban Europe. Some countries may well see the formation of armed militias and concomitant eruptions of more systematic and lethal violence aimed at entire communities. But it is hard to believe that such violence, backed up as it would be by elements of the apparatus of state, would not constitute the most effective squeeze factor imaginable for an Option 1 (Enhanced). In addition, this efficacy would surely (and hopefully) mean that very little application would be necessary.

Given these factors, here is my final prediction: European countries seeking to de-Islamize will move into Option 1 (Standard), supplemented as described above by small amounts of Option 2. As this proves insufficient (which it will) these tactics will segue into Option 1 (Enhanced). In some countries more and more Option 3-type violence will be incorporated. After a period of unspecified time, the will of the Muslim population of the country under consideration will be broken, and decreased resistance from that Muslim population will allow a successful end to de-Islamization through a reversion to Option 1 (Enhanced). There will be no need of a further application of violent tactics.

Of course, this assumes that the spine of the state itself is not broken by the discontinuities a country has to pass through to get to this point, and that the government maintains a strong grip, though not a monopoly, on the use of violence within the country’s borders. If the state does not maintain its firm hold then all bets are off, and unhappy times lie ahead for everyone.