A Follow-Up to “Surrender, Genocide… or What?”
by El Inglés
It appears that my essay “Surrender, Genocide… or What?” attracted a certain amount of attention in a certain part of the blogosphere. Having enjoyed the resulting debate in much the same way one enjoys a blast of sea spray in the face from the prow of a boat, it is probably time to respond slightly more substantively than was possible in the occasional comments I made on various blogs. Any further invective hurled in my direction will simply be a reiteration of invective already gratefully received, and its impact, slight to begin with, greatly attenuated as a result. As such, I doubt I have anything to fear in further clarifying my position and extending my earlier analysis.
This response will be split up into two sections. The first of them deals with the charges of fascism that were directed at the essay. The second section will examine more reasoned objections to various aspects of the content of the essay. I was pleasantly surprised to realize that, irrespective of how valid I considered any particular criticism to be, it could, where relevant, be incorporated into the analytical model I laid down in the essay with a minimum of difficulty. As such, I respond to criticisms in terms of the model as and when possible, given my increased confidence that it constitutes as useful an analytical tool as I am aware of in this regard.
Fascists ‘R’ Us
It came as no surprise to learn that there were those who considered the ideas outlined in the essay to be ‘fascist’ in nature. I owe these people, who flung a wide variety of accusations at me, my thanks. Given that the charges greatly increased the exposure of the essay, which large numbers of intelligent people seem to have read in good faith without seeing anything particularly inappropriate in it, the entire episode has turned out to be very gratifying so far.
It was suggested in certain quarters that the essay was toying with genocide, was dancing around the subject of genocide, and was in fact a piece of genocide porn. Furthermore, we were told, it reeked of fascist ideology, and advocated the adoption of the tools of fascism. The first set of claims has no clear meaning, and I do not propose to discuss it further. As for the second set, that pertaining to fascism, I am not interested in defending myself against it per se. The material is all online, and interested parties can read it and make up their own minds. However, this second set of claims does make the type of accusation that is sure to confront increasing numbers of us in the years to come. It might therefore be profitable to briefly discuss it here in an attempt to explore its most obvious flaws.
The observation that the word fascism has been stripped of meaning in popular discourse by slapdash use is hardly original. Rather than outline my own political philosophy to refute the claim that I am myself a fascist, I will simply point out that the essay in fact has no ideology of any sort in it, fascist or otherwise. Even the most careful reader of the essay would be at a loss to discern my opinions on any ideological issue at all:
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Immigration in general? Nothing.
Importance of ethnic homogeneity in a country? Nothing.
Women’s rights, gay rights? Nothing.
Free markets, protectionism, privatization? Nothing.
Big government vs. small? Nothing.
The environment? Nothing.
The electoral system? Nothing.
The military? Nothing.
Education, healthcare? Nothing.
Some might be tempted to argue that my brief recommendations at the end of the essay bespeak an ideological predisposition to use the coercive apparatus of the state to solve social problems. In fact, I recommend the use of said apparatus because, as the essay makes clear to those who read it without malice aforethought, I believe it is the only way there is any hope of dealing with the problems Islam presents us with before a non-electoral discontinuity becomes inevitable. Others are free to disagree, but the prescription I advance is no more intrinsically ideological than proposing the use of a hammer when inserting nails into wood.
As for the charge that, quite apart from any ideological considerations, I advocate the use of the tools of fascism, well, what are these supposed tools? They are, most obviously, deportations (which I do advocate), and concentration camps (a completely tendentious and loaded term used to refer to internment prior to deportation, something I do discuss and would indeed countenance if I thought the situation warranted it). Having acknowledged this, must I further acknowledge that my critics have a point when they chant ‘fascist’ at me?
In a word, no. I may very well be the most evil person in the history of the world, the illegitimate offspring of Adolf Hitler and Count Dracula, but that has no bearing on the issue one way or the other. The question is whether or not deportations and internment are the tools of fascism, and a brief survey makes it clear that they are anything but. Focusing on internment, a few historical examples will give a feeling for the sheer political variety of states that have availed themselves of this ‘fascist’ option:
|(1)||The internment of approximately 120,000 Japanese Americans and resident Japanese aliens by the U.S. government during World War II.|
|(2)||The internment of approximately 3,000 German and Austrian men in Australia during World War I.|
|(3)||The internment of hundreds of thousands of Boers and black Africans by British forces during the Boer War (1899-1902), which led to the deaths through starvation and disease of as many as 40,000 people from both groups.|
|(4)||The internment of as many as 1.5 million Kenyans by British authorities during the Mau-Mau Uprising (1954-1960), which resulted in the deaths of well over 100,000 people.|
|(5)||The internment and murder of millions of Jews, Poles, Gypsies, homosexuals, and other targeted groups by Nazi Germany during World War II.|
|(6)||Current internment of an estimated 200,000 political prisoners in North Korea.|
|(7)||Internment of an estimated 18 million people in gulags throughout the Soviet Union between 1929 and 1953.|
Interested parties can review many further historical examples of internment and deportations quite easily on Wikipedia. The examples quoted here will surely suffice to establish the geographical and political diversity of polities that have interned substantial numbers of people, the impossibility of ascribing such policies to a single ideology, and the difficulty involved in categorizing them as being fascist or not. Was the U.S. a fascist state during World War II, as indicated in (1)? Or can one intern innocent people during wartime without descending into fascism, freeing the U.S. in (1) and Australia in (2) from having to face this charge? Or is Australia, in (2), not exempt, because it had not suffered a direct attack prior to commencing the internment, as the U.S. had at Pearl Harbour? Was Australia then a fascist state during World War I? Or were the numbers interned too small? Or too white? Or too German?
If being at war is indeed a mitigating factor, do we decide that the Nazi internment of Jews in Sobibor and Treblinka (both constructed well into World War II), in (5), was not fascist, though their mass murder was? Given that the UK is currently at war in Iraq and Afghanistan, can it consider interning some of its Muslim population without having to worry about being fascist? Or is a common religion, in contrast with a common ethnicity or nationality, not sufficient justification? If being at war in these two Muslim countries is not enough, our own Muslim population being predominantly of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin, can we start interning them in a non-fascist manner as long as we are decent enough to declare war on Pakistan and Bangladesh in advance? Or are we already at war with Pakistan given its support for our Taliban foes in Afghanistan, and therefore allowed to start interning Pakistanis without delay?
This blizzard of conceptual difficulties becomes all the thicker when we move on to a fairly depressing pair of examples of British internment during the days and in the territories of the British Empire. The Kenyan example (4) is particularly horrifying, and the Boer internment (3) constitutes one of the more underwhelming innovations of the Victorian period, to put it mildly. Was Britain a fascist state from 1954-1960? And in 1899-1902? Did it flick back and forth between fascism just in time to fight World War II against fascism? Or was it not fascist at all because we were careful to inflict these horrors outside our own country? Does that matter? Were we fascists abroad and constitutional monarchists at home? Is that possible? Was the Soviet Union a fascist entity, with its gulags (7) identifying it as such? Is the North Korean version of the gulag system (6) also the product of a fascist government?
One of the methods of execution favoured by the Einsatzgruppen during their extermination sprees on the Eastern Front was the machine-gunning of victims into mass graves, often dug by the victims themselves. Shall we conclude that machine guns are the tools of Nazism? It certainly seems plausible: fascists have used internment and deportation, which are therefore the tools of fascism; Nazis have used machine guns, which are therefore the tools of Nazism. U.S. forces in Iraq are therefore Nazis, as were Israeli forces during the Six Day War, and British forces during the Falklands War. The logic is inescapable, if logic is not your strong point.
Machine guns are not the tools of Nazism, any more than internment or deportation are the tools of fascism. Machine guns are the tools of those who have chosen to extend a certain kind of kinetic lethality over distances reaching out to several hundred yards. Internment is the tool of those who believe that large numbers of people must be segregated from the wider world, temporarily or permanently. Deportation is the tool of those who believe that some number of people must be permanently removed from certain territories. That is all. They are simply different mechanisms of physical coercion. The morality of their use in any particular situation can be debated without end. But to consider either internment or deportation to be intrinsically fascist would be equivalent to considering the firing of machine guns at people to be intrinsically Nazi-like. Is this the position of those who have labelled me in these terms? Are they happy to defend this position?
Enough. No more evidence of the fatuousness of equating internment or deportations with fascism is required here. If I seem complacent about the possibility of interning and/or deporting large numbers of people from my own country, let me make it clear that I am not. I consider the possibility of having to do such things horrendous, not least because it would constitute a hideous injury to the very fabric of my society. But there are other injuries that a country can suffer, some of them fatal, and drawing closer by the day. I make no apology for choosing the lesser of the two evils, as I perceive them.
Other Points and Criticisms
Assimilation — Possible After All?
The first and perhaps most frequent criticism of my essay was that I had ignored the possibility of Muslims assimilating into European society. Strictly speaking, it was not ignored, it was simply dismissed in ‘The Danish Civil War’ which “Surrender, Genocide… or What?” took as a starting point. However, I must confess that even ‘The Danish Civil War’ only contained a relatively peremptory discussion of the issue, so there is clearly some clarification required in this regard.
What does it mean to assimilate? I will adopt an operational definition here, in which assimilation refers to a state of affairs in which it is simply not observed that an immigrant community behaves in such a manner as to create any significant threat to the viability or security of the host country. Hindus and Sikhs are therefore assimilated in the UK, irrespective of the depth or breadth of their attachment to aspects of their original cultures, religions or languages. Muslims, obviously, are not. Whether or not immigrant groups disproportionately responsible for crime, such as Jamaicans, would be considered assimilated under this definition is an open question, but not one of any particular relevance here.
Needless to say, a small enough Muslim population will always appear to be assimilated according to this definition, and a large enough immigrant population of whatever type might not be considered assimilated, irrespective of how productive and law-abiding it might be. I, for example, have great regard for the Hindu population of the UK (we fascists and ethnic cleansers often do), but would have difficulty considering it assimilated if it made up 50% of the population of the country.
Definition out of the way, what do we observe in Europe with respect to Muslim populations? We observe that not a single one of these populations (Finnish Tatars to one side, as I consider them to represent a fundamentally different phenomenon) ever exhibits any significant degree of assimilation other than the faux assimilation of massive numerical inferiority. We observe further that even this faux assimilation breaks down at an astonishingly low fractional Muslim population. Anyone who doubts this would do well to consider the demonstrations in the UK following the publishing of The Satanic Verses in 1989, during which thousands of Muslims openly and publicly called for the death of Salman Rushdie. I am uncertain of the size of the Muslim population in 1989, but given that it is not thought to be much greater than 3% at present, and has grown massively in the last 19 years, the basic point is clear.
In addition to the above, we can make a further observation: as mentioned above, other racially similar populations (namely Hindus and Sikhs, the UK’s Muslim population originated overwhelmingly in Pakistan and Bangladesh) have assimilated into UK society with few obvious difficulties for the society at large, irrespective of the difficulties that they themselves undoubtedly had to overcome in the process. No other groups of immigrants cause anything like the fundamental, and in my opinion existential, problems that Muslims do, and Muslims always cause them once their numbers are anything other than trivial.
Given the absence of examples of real assimilation (i.e. assimilation at non-trivial fractional populations), it is surely legitimate to suggest that the burden of proof is on those who would argue that Muslims will, or even can, assimilate. Let them explain why that which did not happen, in the early days of Muslim integration, before today’s problems even existed, can happen in the hugely polarized and rapidly disintegrating situation that already obtains in several European countries. Until I hear substantive arguments to this effect, I will continue to reject the possibility of assimilation as defined here.
The Aztec Strategy
It has been suggested by a fairly bad-tempered commenter at Gates of Vienna that what I shall call the Aztec Strategy is not only an option to add to the three I presented as being exhaustive in the essay, but the option of choice for the discerning citizen concerned about Islamization. It seems to consist of destroying every obvious physical manifestation of the religion in question, and making it clear, in no uncertain terms, that the former adherents of said religion are to behave themselves, or else. As I understand it, an implementation of the Aztec Strategy would see the razing of mosques, the killing of imams and other prominent Muslims, the burning of copies of the Quran, and the prohibition of any practice of Islam.
Very well, how does this option look in light of my model? Let us suppose that Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party in the Netherlands were to be elected today, with an outright majority, to give the country an electoral discontinuity as described in the essay. Mr Wilders, after due consideration, appears on Dutch television declaring that he has decided to implement the Aztec Strategy in the Netherlands, with the tanks rumbling into position in key urban areas as he speaks. Is it not reasonably obvious that this would collapse the electoral discontinuity into a non-electoral discontinuity, with the entire country descending into chaos and flames in about five minutes? The Aztec Strategy becomes moot as soon as it is implemented in a country like the Netherlands, for reasons explained in detail in “Surrender, Genocide… or What?”.
What about a country like Finland, with a much smaller Muslim population than that of the Netherlands? Could the Aztec Strategy be successfully implemented there? I suspect the answer is yes. But let us be clear about the sheer brutality that the Aztec Strategy entails: the systematic execution of large numbers of unarmed people, the casualties that would be incurred, overwhelmingly on the Muslim side, as mosques were bulldozed and homes searched for things Islamic to be carried off and burned. If a government, post electoral discontinuity, had the sheer will to act in such a manner, why would it need to? Why not bring a halt to Muslim immigration, deport whatever fraction of the Muslim population seemed appropriate (focusing on those without Finnish citizenship, those with criminal records, those who had explicitly demanded Islamization, young males, the unemployed, etc.), and make the new anti-Islamic stance of the country clear to all concerned? This would be a much easier policy to implement, much more humane, much less damaging to the country’s international standing, and much less likely to cause scars to the psychological fabric of the country as a whole.
To sum up, the Aztec Strategy will be one of two things. It will either be a mechanism for instantly collapsing an electoral discontinuity into a non-electoral discontinuity, rendering itself meaningless by spurring an escalation that rapidly swamps it, or it will be a sledgehammer to crack a nut, a needlessly brutal response to a problem best handled differently. Unless the strategy includes subtleties that I have missed so far, it is hard to see that there is much to recommend it.
What is the Law For?
Another common objection to the essay was that European countries could deal with the danger of Islamization by simply choosing to enforce the law. Make it clear that the law of the land is to be obeyed, without the police turning a blind eye to the honour killings, forced marriages, and rampant criminality of Muslims, and everything would turn out fine. This rather touching idea is superficially appealing, to be sure. We have laws. We must apply them. Muslims will then understand who is the boss. All our problems will go away.
This, supposedly, is the fourth option missing from my essay that allows us to deal with our Muslim problem without drastically reducing its numbers. I will ignore the obvious objection that Muslims are already deeply engaged in the process of applying various types of pressure throughout Europe to have the law corrupted and corroded to suit their own purposes, for the simple reason that the idea falls flat on its face even before such pernicious long-term considerations are taken into account. The law enforcement apparatus of a country is not some arbitrarily flexible and powerful entity capable of simply ‘enforcing the law’ anytime it pleases. Consisting of, at a minimum, the police, the courts, and the prison system, it is a massively expensive entity, representing decades, if not centuries, of accumulated expertise, institutional memory, physical infrastructure, and law enforcement doctrine. It is not designed, created, or maintained willy-nilly, with no regard for the characteristics of the country in question. Rather, it is a tool designed to achieve certain ends in a reasonably effective and efficient manner.
Syria is run by an Alawite clique that will very quickly find itself swinging from lampposts, along with large numbers of its co-religionists, in the event of a successful revolution. It has therefore constructed a law enforcement apparatus (not to mention a military) predominantly for the purpose of pre-empting, defusing, and, if necessary, crushing any threats to its rule, not for issuing parking tickets or arresting people for singing songs about turbans. Japan, on the other hand, a democracy where the system of government enjoys exceptional legitimacy, racial strife is essentially non-existent, riots and civil disturbances virtually unheard of, crime rates exceptionally low, and people not socially or culturally inclined to violence, has a completely different law enforcement apparatus, with the most frequent roles of the Japanese police being the issuing of directions and the stopping of cyclists to check that their transportation has not been registered as stolen. If the Japanese police were suddenly faced with Syrian-style law enforcement ‘challenges,’ are we so foolish as to believe they would be able to deal with them by just ‘enforcing the law’?
Continuing in this vein, it should be clear that European police forces are not, by any stretch of the imagination, in a position to enforce the law with respect to large Muslim populations, a task radically beyond their capabilities. To generalize for a moment, European police forces have been tailored to the law enforcement requirements of policing relatively law-abiding, prosperous countries, where systems of government and law enjoy general approval. They were not created to pacify rapidly growing and chronically criminal, if not seditious, Muslim populations. Suggesting that, for example, Sweden enforce the law amongst its Muslim population with its existing police force is like equipping a lumberjack with a bread knife and then insisting that he cut down an oak tree.
Those who are not yet convinced by my claim that this option does not constitute a meaningful addition to the three in my essay should consider the following thought experiment. France has a Muslim population (be they nominal or actually practicing Muslims) of approximately 10% of the population. The estimates vary, but exact figures are not really relevant here, so I will take the 10% as a round figure. Could the French state simply solve the existential problems posed to it by its Muslim population by ‘enforcing the law’ without collapsing what would be, in effect, analogous to an electoral discontinuity into a non-electoral discontinuity? Could it tame those suburbs where the writ of French law does not currently seem to run without escalating the situation beyond control or recall? Let us suppose that it could. Could it do the same with a Muslim population of 15%? Let us suppose that this too would be possible. If we continue to increase the Muslim population by increments of 5%, it is fairly obvious that, eventually, we reach a point where this successful law-based pacification would simply not be possible. Given that this situation must exist at and above some fractional Muslim population, it is surely legitimate to consider where this demarcation point might lie.
I will not pretend to be able to answer this question with any accuracy, but anyone who has given any serious thought to the riots in France in 2005 would, I am confident, have difficulty concluding that the French state was in a position to enforce the law throughout its territory without sending in the army. To reiterate, the French law enforcement apparatus is simply not designed to control vast swathes of territory inhabited by hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of angry young males prepared to use violence up to and including the lethal against the police. Indeed, it barely seems to be able to contain their quotidian criminality, let alone the nationwide flare-ups of said criminality. ‘Enforcing the law’ is no more an option in dealing with burgeoning, unassimilable Muslim populations than the waving of magic wands, or the sprinkling of pixie dust. It is not an alternative to the options laid down in the original essay in key countries of concern, and even in those where it might still be, the window of opportunity closes a little further every year. Of course we should enforce the law as and when we can. But anyone who thinks that this prescription will suffice needs to start arguing their case in a more serious manner, for it has little substance at present.
What prompted me to write the essay that evoked such a strong response in some quarters? A desire to whip up a nationwide pogrom against Muslims and rule The Crusading Republic of Albion from atop a throne of cloven Muslim skulls? Or a desire to instigate mob violence and civil disintegration which I could then enjoy as I skulked, cackling maniacally, through the streets of London?
Sadly, the answer is ‘neither of the above.’ If only I were that exciting, that dangerous, that great an evil mastermind. No, the reason I wrote the essay is far more prosaic. Many websites and media sources spend a lot of time and energy charting the trajectory of Islamization in Europe, whether through original reporting or collating and analyzing incidents and trends brought to light by others. But implicit in all this activity is the notion that, if events continue along their current course, something unpleasant awaits us. Were this not the case, and were an increasingly Islamized future not likely to be worse in any way than our non-Islamized past, why pay any attention to the issue? Why give it a moment’s thought?
I think I can legitimately say that I did in my essay what every single person who has ever expressed any concern about Islamization has done: I made some predictions. But instead of making them unconsciously, vaguely, ambiguously, implicitly, or internally, I made them consciously, in detail, clearly, explicitly, and in written form in a public forum. I also made them as rigorously as possible, and explained at length the reasons I considered them valid. Having done this, I explained briefly what I would do to deal with the situation in my own country. The prescriptions here were intentionally lacking in detail, as formulating an actionable policy response would require far more information and expertise than I possess. Nonetheless, they do constitute a rough outline of what I believe would constitute an appropriate and measured defence against the ongoing Islamization of my country.
I will not pretend to understand the mentality of those who dedicate considerable time and energy to charting the course of Islamization, only to denounce as fascists those who try to predict where that course might lead us, or what we should do on the basis of those predictions. However, it seems (and you must picture me twiddling my handlebar moustache as I say this) that the usefulness of these people is rapidly coming to an end. If they are willing to hasten their slide into irrelevance through publicly displaying their own foolishness, I am perfectly happy to provide them with opportunities to do so.