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Part V: A Discredited State
“As the slow motion train crash that is Europe’s experiment with Muslim immigration moves on to its inevitable conclusion, we continue to see a sharp polarization between those Europeans who wish, for whatever reason, to continue the experiment and those who wish to bring it to an end. As each European country collapses into its own Muslim Troubles, there will be no cover, politically speaking, for those politicians and public figures who span us tall tales all along about the wonders of the multi-faith Shangri-las we were building.”
This is the conclusion of a five-part series by El Inglés comparing and contrasting the Troubles in Northern Ireland with the coming Muslim Troubles in Britain. Previously:
Part One,
Part Two,
Part Three, and
Part Four.
All five parts are now available as
a single document in pdf format (thanks to
Vlad).
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Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland
by El InglésX. Political Implications
So far we have limited our consideration of matters political to the assumption that the state will vacillate its way into and through at least the initial stages of the conflict. However, there is a little more to say on the subject of the mainstream political response to the conflict we predict and explore in this document.
Western European nations have been implementing for several decades, more or less consistently, policies which have the inevitable consequence of turning once-homogeneous countries into much more heterogeneous ones, racially, religiously, culturally, and linguistically. We have been encouraged to believe that, not only has this been a good thing, it is bigoted and evil not to believe that it has been a good thing. Calamitous change has thus been justified by the gossamer banalities of multiculturalism, whose orthogonal relationship with reality is now dawning on the worried architects of the culturally-enriched states of modern Europe.
As the slow motion train crash that is Europe’s experiment with Muslim immigration moves on to its inevitable conclusion, we continue to see a sharp polarization between those Europeans who wish, for whatever reason, to continue the experiment and those who wish to bring it to an end. As each European country collapses into its own Muslim Troubles, there will be no cover, politically speaking, for those politicians and public figures who span us tall tales all along about the wonders of the multi-faith Shangri-las we were building.
To put it at its bluntest, one cannot present oneself as the person to save one’s country from the horrific tribal violence that it has recently descended into when one has spent the last however-many decades cramming as many people of the hostile, enemy tribe in question into that country and describing all opposition to those efforts as racist, bigoted, or worse. We will examine in a later section the way in which the Troubles only came to an end when key decision-makers in the paramilitary organizations on each side decided that they were prepared to lay down their arms to try and reach a negotiated peace. Here we will simply stress the significance of this point: if paramilitaries continue to fight, no government can force a peace. And it is utterly inconceivable that any British paramilitary organization would cease hostilities in this fashion if it believed that the political figures attempting to mediate that process were implicated in the mass immigration, multiculturalism, and Muslim appeasement that had led to the conflict in the first place. As such, any government or person so implicated will be utterly ineffective as a mediator.
In the Netherlands, there exists a politician, Geert Wilders, and a political party, the Dutch Freedom Party, committed to defending the Dutch people and their country from the disaster it has been plunging toward for the last several decades. Whatever unpleasant things some might believe of Mr. Wilders, few would doubt that he means what he says about defending his country and way of life. We are not interested here in trying to predict what will happen in the Netherlands, but we will suggest that any Dutch paramilitary that may emerge to defend the Dutch people as and when the state fails to do so will presumably consider Wilders to be a man worth doing business with, a man who might be worth listening to if he asks them to lay down their guns and let the state take over in meeting the Muslim threat.
One of the greatest dangers we in Britain face with respect to our forthcoming Muslim Troubles is the possibility that all such potential actors will already have discredited themselves in the eyes of British paramilitaries. This is one of the great evils of our electoral system. If we look at the populist right-wing parties throughout Europe that are espousing nationalism and opposing Islam, Islamization, and Muslim immigration, we observe that they are, overwhelmingly, new parties that have only been able to flourish because the electoral systems of their respective countries are based on proportional representation. To take the most obvious example, Wilders’ Freedom Party has attained the influence it currently enjoys because the re-tribalization of Dutch politics made inevitable by Muslim immigration is shunting large numbers of angry Dutch people (which is to say, Dutch-Dutch people) to his party. Even if everyone else in the country considers him to be Lucifer incarnate, his party can simply content itself with taking its share of the vote and seeing the whole of Dutch politics start to dance to its tune.
None of this can happen in the British system. The Dutch Freedom Party won about 16% of the vote in the 2010 election, which gives it a great deal of power. In contrast, winning 16% of the vote in a UK election renders one irrelevant apart from in those very rare cases where a hung parliament opens up the possibility of a coalition government. In the 2005 general election in the UK, the Liberal Democrats won 18.3% of the vote, which gave them 52 out of 646 seats and rendered them essentially impotent, as it did every party other than Labour, who won a significant majority. In other words, a party can win nearly a fifth of the vote in a general election and still attain neither outright power, nor a place in a governing coalition, nor even the slightest possibility of a place in a governing coalition for the simple reason that no such coalition is required.
This is an electoral system that could have been designed to kill off political innovation and ensure the mainstream parties are almost unassailable in the great big coin-toss that happens once every few years in the UK. UKIP, the closest equivalent to the Dutch Freedom Party in the UK, won 16% of the vote in the European election in 2009. Granted, the European elections are often used to register protest votes, so this result should not be taken as meaning that 16% of the British public considers UKIP its preferred party across the board. Nonetheless, despite their popularity clearly being far greater than their 3% of the vote in the 2010 general election would suggest, they have yet to win a single seat in the House of Commons. As a consequence of this lopsidedness in British elections, debates vis-à-vis Islam and Muslim immigration in mainstream British politics take place entirely within the confines of what the three main parties are comfortable with. No party can storm the pitch from the sidelines, breaking taboos the way Wilders does in the Netherlands, because those who do break taboos, like the BNP, simply do not have to be responded to by anyone with a chance of winning.
Of the three main parties, the only one that could reasonably be expected to start trying to turn the British ship of state around before it crashes onto the shores of our Muslim Troubles is the Conservative Party. Now, as by far the strongest party in a coalition government after thirteen years in the wilderness, it is starting to strut its stuff with respect to the terrible problems we face, and its stuff is not especially reassuring. To be sure, David Cameron has indicated that he will not be prepared to tolerate certain of the things that Labour turned a blind eye to, and the government has already started to make far-reaching changes to the immigration system, the single most crucial area of policy. But there is no public recognition from the Conservatives of the breadth or depth of the problems Islam and Muslims pose us in Britain, and this is what is crucial. Perhaps David Cameron is well aware of what we face, but does not feel he can talk about it. This may seem like a wise course of action to him at present, but can only discredit him and his party later on. One cannot feign ignorance of an iceberg, crash into it, and still insist that one is uniquely qualified to deal with the ensuing catastrophe, because, truth be told, one had seen it all along. This will not convince anyone of one’s qualifications for dealing with the problem, least of all those who have committed murderous acts of violence on behalf of paramilitary organizations.
In short, the Conservatives are in danger, not imminent danger, but danger nonetheless, of discrediting themselves as a party capable of understanding and dealing with the threat we face. We are, of course, obliged to take into account the fact that they are part of a coalition and are therefore somewhat constrained in what they do. Even so, it is far from obvious that they are up to the challenge of charting the dramatic change of course that would be required to put clear blue water between us and the ever-closer hulk of our Muslim Troubles, which lie directly ahead.
It will come to be seen as a historic misfortune that the window of opportunity for dealing with the threat our Muslim population poses us without massive violence happened to coincide with a juncture at which our main centre-right party was busy trying to convince the UK electorate that it was no longer the ‘nasty party.’ However peripheral non-entities such as Baroness Warsi may be to the real power in the Conservative Party, the mere fact that Cameron has felt the need to parachute them into such prominent positions as party chairman shows how hard the Conservatives are trying to be all things to all people. Could we imagine Geert Wilders dragging some token Moroccan into his party to convince people that he was tight with the believers?
Is it a coincidence that the only European country to have seen the rise of a robust, successful, anti-Islamic street movement like the EDL is also the only country to have no mainstream political party that has woken up to the threat of Islam, not Islamism, not radical Islam, not extremist Islam, but Islam itself? We cannot say for sure, but it seems likely that opposition to Islam will emerge by hook or by crook, and that if it does not do so through electoral politics, it will have to do so some other way. Whether it likes it or not, the EDL is already on course to become the UDA of our Muslim Troubles. There are undoubtedly UVFs waiting to emerge as well. Is this what our political masters want?
There are presumably people in the Netherlands who believe that Wilders is a threat to their democracy. But this is a mistake. Wilders is the last hope of their democracy, as a democracy that destroys the possibility of peaceful, political self-correction, will make inevitable violent, apolitical self-correction, and kill democracy itself in the process. Wilders is the last chance the Netherlands will have to avoid blood on the streets. And the window of opportunity is closing even for him.
XI. The Two Insanities
We have already stated our core assumption that the British government will, by and large, be wholly ineffective in the face of the violent conflict that breaks out between British and Muslims and seek merely to contain it. However, there are crucial issues pertaining to the government response that must be considered beyond this assumption. The violent conflict that we predict in this document is not something that can be solved in any obvious sense by any government. But there are still certain potential courses of action that different parts of the apparatus of state can take within the constraints of our earlier assumption that are of relevance here.
Broadly speaking, the long-term objectives of British paramilitaries in the conflict will include at least the following: