The Danish Civil War

It is my pleasure to introduce a new Gates of Vienna correspondent, a Briton who prefers to go by the name of “El Inglés”.

The speculative future scenario El Inglés lays out below is one of his own devising, yet it agrees with many of my own intuitions about the process now unfolding in Europe. The congruity with my own views is further emphasized by the location in the story where the European resistance begins: Denmark.

Concerning the availability of firearms in Denmark: one of my Danish contacts lives in a rural area, and he most of his neighbors own guns. He had assumed that these were all legal hunting firearms, registered with the police. He found out that this was not true, and also that the local police were well aware of all the unregistered guns, but were not concerned about it.

This made me feel even more optimistic about Denmark.

Now I’ll let El Inglés take over. This account is a long one, but bear with it; it’s well worth reading all the way through.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
The Danish Civil War — Prologue and Early Stages
by El Inglés

Introduction

As in all those parts of Europe with large and growing Muslim minorities, Denmark had experienced great difficulty in the early years of the 21st century in trying to maintain its historic freedoms and cultural traditions in the face of the increasingly strident demands of its Islamic population. However, due to a variety of factors including the unhealed scars of the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy (hereafter referred to as the MCC) and the manifest incompatibility of native Danish culture with Shari’a law, the situation worsened considerably in the years immediately after said controversy. The Danish government had some success in slowing the rate of growth of the Muslim population through its new restrictions on granting citizenship on the basis of marriage. However, by the outbreak of the civil war in 2013, that fraction of the population accounted for by Muslims was estimated to be 11%, pushed upward as it was through continued immigration and higher fertility rates among Muslims. Emigration from Denmark, particularly on the part of university-educated native Danes in their 20s and 30s, exacerbated the demographic situation.


In June 2008, a simultaneous suicide bombing destroyed five buses in Copenhagen, killing 68 people and wounding 174. Though condemned by all prominent Muslim groups in Denmark, opinion polls made it clear that a significant fraction of Muslims in the country sympathized with the bombers, who had issued martyrdom videos saying that the Danish presence in Iraq and Afghanistan and the MCC had left Muslims ‘no option’ but to strike back. In a pattern seen in the UK after the 7/7 bombings there, Muslim groups became more confident than ever in pressing their demands for concessions of various sorts. Insisting that, however terrible the bombings might have been, they would not stop until Muslims felt their grievances against the Danish state had been addressed, Muslim advocacy groups pushed forward with a series of initiatives designed to drive foreign and domestic policies in directions considered more amenable to Islamic mores.

In response to these challenges, the Danish government adopted a policy of granting key concessions in what can only be considered an attempt at appeasement. During this initiative, which lasted from early 2009 until July 2012, the Danish government introduced a raft of measures to try to placate Muslim opinion in Denmark. The most important of these were as follows:

Autonomous Cultural Zones

Certain geographically limited urban areas with majority Muslim populations were recognized as Autonomous Cultural Zones. Here, local councils were allowed to pass certain supplementary laws in accordance with the cultural demands of the inhabitants. As these areas all had Muslim-majority councils, this was essentially a rubber stamp for certain Shari’a legal provisions to be introduced without having to make the nature of the concession explicit. Provisions introduced included the prohibition of the sale or consumption of alcohol or pork products and a strict dress code which prohibited the wearing of T-shirts or other ‘revealing’ items to men and women alike. Though ostensibly enforceable by the police via on-the-spot fines, in practice the police presence in these areas dwindled from little to nothing in a matter of weeks. This allowed local Muslim enforcers to step well outside the newly established boundaries, demanding far greater adherence to the Shari’a than had been legally mandated. In combination, these developments drove virtually all non-Muslims and significant numbers of Muslims out of these areas.

Shari’a Courts

The Danish government allowed the creation of Shari’a courts to allow Muslims to resolve marriage, divorce and inheritance-related issues in accordance with Shari’a law. Strictly speaking, participation was optional, with any Muslim being free to insist on dealing with these matters via the existing court system. In practice however, community pressures up to and including the threat of violence forced many Muslims, particularly women, to deal with the Shari’a courts against their will.

In addition to effectively stripping thousands of Muslim women of their rights under Danish law, the new courts were not long established before their advocates started demanding that the scope of their activities be expanded, to allow them to apply Shari’a rulings in relation to crime as well. These attempts were still underway when the events of July 5, 2012 took place.
- - - - - - - - -
Muslim Foreign Affairs Advisory Council

A sum of $10 million per annum was set aside to fund the activities of the Muslim Foreign Affairs Advisory Council, a body dedicated to researching how Denmark could enjoy better relations with the Islamic world. Though lacking any official authority, the level of funding awarded, the prestige afforded the new body, and the degree of access it enjoyed to decision-makers marked a significant coup for Muslim activists in Denmark.

During the approximately three years it was in existence, the MFAAC generated an unceasing flow of proposals. Whether recommending the cessation of diplomatic ties with Israel, the donation of 1% of GDP per annum for aid to the Muslim world, or formal apologies from Danish ambassadors for the MCC in Muslim countries, the focus of the MFAAC on pursuing Muslim interests led it to be viewed by many as an active fifth column.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
The events of July 5, 2012 stopped these developments in their tracks. A public press conference due to feature key Cabinet members and representatives of leading Muslim groups had been scheduled for the purpose of reaffirming bilateral support for the ailing concession-based policies. At 11:58, two minutes before it was due to start, a massive truck bomb was driven at speed into the security detail at the entrance of the government building in downtown Copenhagen where the conference was due to be held. Estimated to have contained over a tonne and a half of high explosive, the blast obliterated the venue, also destroying two medium-height buildings across the road and causing significant damage to every structure within a 200m radius. The attack claimed the lives of 346 people, wounded 1,500, many of them seriously, and caused $900 million of damage in total. A previously-unknown Islamic terrorist group claimed responsibility for the atrocity, which it said had succeeded in its twin objectives of striking a blow against the Danish Crusader regime and also at those apostate Muslims who recognized its authority.

Needless to say, once the ensuing political chaos had abated somewhat, the sitting government and its concession-based approach to things Islamic had fallen out of favour. An election held on September 23 was unprecedented in Danish history for the picture of polarization it presented. Radical Islamist parties captured a majority of the Muslim vote. Though their platforms differed, they showed thematic similarities, ranging as they did from demanding regional autonomy to advocating outright secession on the basis of a geographically consolidated Muslim bloc in possession of key infrastructural items such as ports and airports.

On the other hand, the newly formed strongly centre-right coalition advocated a set of draconian anti-Islamization, if not anti-Islamic, policies. These included the deportation of any Muslims without Danish citizenship, the drafting of new legislation prohibiting the implementation of any aspect of Shari’a law in Denmark, indefinite detention of any Muslim suspected of supporting political Islam in any form, and the repeal of all legislation introduced by the previous government to support its policy of concessions.

On election day, the coalition swept the board to attain a huge majority in the Danish Parliament, a result which prompted riots across Denmark, not only of Muslims, but anarchist and hard-left groups. As the riots entered their second week, a state of emergency was declared and the Danish military was ordered to maintain order in key urban areas with large Muslim populations. Copycat riots in other European countries, though smaller in scale, prompted European governments concerned about their domestic Muslim populations to urge the Danish government to show restraint and ‘reach out’ to its embittered Muslim minority.

Of course, events in Denmark were not taking place in a vacuum. The election of the centre-right coalition and the growing realization on the part of European publics (if not yet their governments) of the magnitude of the divide between Muslim and non-Muslim Europeans did not go unnoticed in the Muslim world. Despite initial displays of sympathy from Muslim governments around the world following the July 5 attacks, retaliation against the Danish state (or the Danish Entity, as Danes themselves now humorously referred to it) by the Muslim world was swift. Having learnt valuable lessons during the MCC, the new Danish government had increased security and withdrawn non-vital personnel from its embassies throughout the Muslim world immediately upon being elected. However, Danish diplomatic and business interests were attacked in Pakistan, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, and Iran, resulting in dozens of deaths and the almost complete withdrawal of Danish corporate activity from Muslim-majority countries. Danish citizens were warned against travelling anywhere in the Muslim world, though the number who would have felt inclined to do so was presumably negligible by then anyway.

Moving into 2013, it was still far from clear how events would play out, but a number of trends made it obvious that there was little hope that things might improve. Various key trends merit discussion here.

Increasing Segregation

Violence and intimidation directed towards non-Muslims living in or around areas dominated by Muslim populations saw a dramatic rise during the Seven Month Calm (as it is now called), from September 23, 2012 to April 23, 2013. At the same time, suspicion, hostility, and violence directed towards Muslims also increased sharply, inducing many of those who lived outside the ghettoes to relocate back in.

Genuinely well-integrated Muslims gained attention during this period for the unusually cruel nature of their plight. Trapped as they were between the choices of a forced embrace of the mushrooming Islamic fanaticism in the ghettoes and the now almost-universal hostility towards them and their religion amongst other Danes, several prominent Muslims made high-profile exits from the country. It would be hard to say which side missed them the least.

Declining Authority of the State

Islamic claims that the Danish state had no authority were hardly a novelty in Denmark, following on as naturally as they did from the universalist claims of the Shari’a. However, native Danes were also becoming increasingly vocal in their complaints that the entire apparatus of state had failed to carry out its most basic responsibilities to the people it was elected to serve. From trenchant criticisms of decades of Danish immigration policy to the huge jump in gun purchases and the formation of informal militias, there was suddenly an abundance of evidence supporting the notion that Danes now viewed their government as an incompetent blunderer at best, an active enabler of Islamization at worst.

The rot went deeper than mere scepticism about the merits of specific parties. Having obtained power in September, the new government was struggling to carry out its election pledges. The planned deportations were proving to be a legal and logistical minefield, with government lawyers finding themselves hamstrung by EU Human Rights Legislation, and opposed at every turn by domestic and international human rights organizations. At the same time, the Danish kroner and stock markets, hit hard by July 5, continued to struggle due to the ongoing political crisis, and Danish trade with the Muslim world had dried up entirely due to boycotts. It was far from clear what the current government, or indeed any government, could do to extract the country from the predicament it now faced.

Heightened Militant Activity Among Muslims

In Denmark, as in all European countries, intelligence services had been monitoring the activists of Islamists for many years. However, an alarming spike in Islamist infiltration and activity was clearly visible during the Seven Month Calm.

Osama bin Laden’s successor and former second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had issued a video statement immediately after the July 5 bombings congratulating the terrorists and saying that Europe was tottering and would soon fall into the hands of Islam. There was speculation among intelligence communities in Western nations that this was a coded message to Islamic terrorists around the world to converge on European countries. Either way, it was soon clear that infiltration into Europe of Islamic militants with experience fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries was surging, as were the criminal activities associated with them; drug dealing and credit card rackets to supplement their foreign funding, and arms and explosives smuggling for purposes it was difficult to be sanguine about.

Analysis of the relevant data showed that Denmark was a key target for these infiltrators to a disproportionate extent. This bias, though slight, was a source of concern for Danish intelligence. However, the open borders of the EU made it difficult to control the movement of Islamic radicals effectively.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
April 23

Though it is not yet clear exactly what happened on April 23, 2013 to trigger the momentous events that followed, a broad outline can be offered here with some confidence. At approximately 19:30, a native Danish couple were taking a stroll at the edge of one of the ex-Autonomous Cultural Zones in Copenhagen when they were approached by a group of four or five young Muslim men. The men insisted that the Danish girl should cover her head or leave the area. She refused, leading to a violent altercation between her companion and the men, which resulted in him being knocked unconsciousness with a fractured skull. The girl herself was dragged off into a nearby alley and gang raped, after which the Muslim men left. Still in shock, the girl called her brother, who then made two phone calls. The first was to the ambulance service, as both the girl and her boyfriend were in urgent need of medical attention. The second was to the leader of a small Copenhagen militia of which he himself was a member.

It seems that the ambulance service and the eight members of the militia arrived at the scene at the same time. The militia members, heavily armed with semi-automatic rifles and in vehicles, ignored the attempts of two policemen who had happened upon the scene to placate them. After ensuring that the young man and woman were being treated and asking for a description of their assailants, they drove off in the general direction they concluded they must have gone, back into the ex-ACZ.

Details of what ensued are difficult to ascertain. However, it seems that the militia members quickly encountered two men whom they considered a good match for the descriptions they had received. Disembarking nearby, they challenged the men and, after a brief verbal altercation, shot and killed them. Having chosen, for reasons that are not clear, not to leave the area immediately despite the unfavourable attention they were now receiving from a growing crowd of angry Muslims, they came under fire and returned it. Given the aforementioned crowd, and the militia’s high capacity military-issue rifles, chaos quickly ensued, with dozens of Muslim casualties.

Though property damage in the surrounding area, caused largely by fire, destroyed much of the existing CCTV hardware, footage from those left untouched was later combined with that automatically transmitted to police headquarters to provide a gripping, though fragmentary, depiction of the last stand of the surrounded militia members. For approximately an hour, the gradually dwindling band tried to fight its way back out of the ex-ACZ it had entered, inflicting scores of casualties on Muslims armed with firearms and Molotov cocktails. The end, when it came, was gruesome. After running out of ammunition, the sole surviving militia member, with a gunshot wound clearly visible in the left side of his abdomen, was surrounded and torn to pieces by an enraged Muslim mob.

This final footage was time-stamped 21:37, April 23, 2013, as good a moment as any other to mark the start of the open warfare that erupted across the entire country as word of the battle spread.

April 24

In a marked departure from earlier Muslim riots in Europe, the Danish riots that commenced the night of April 23 had a much more serious character from the start, and nowhere was this more visible than in the nature of the violence. Though there was the predictable amount of Molotov cocktail-throwing, car-torching, and raw physical violence on the part of Muslims, there was also a large amount of firearm violence. Crude and largely ineffectual though it tended to be, it caused a number of casualties throughout the day. Suspicions of some degree of organization and preparation were to be proved correct by subsequent events.

More striking was the response of the other side, particularly the militias. The sheer scale of the violence, its geographical range and the number of people involved made it impossible for the police and the army to seal it off from the country at large. Though the violence was focused in and around the Muslim ghettos, the lack of any boundaries between these areas and their surroundings turned virtually every urban area in Denmark into a potential battle zone.

In response, as the government entered an emergency session to formulate a response to the situation and the police and army were deployed in strategic locations, many Danish citizens, most of them members of one of the large number of militias, fought back against Muslims with startling ruthlessness. The ready availability of firearms in Denmark coupled with the high average level of firearms training in the country meant that the militias were in a strong position to contest the situation. Violence raged across great swathes of urban Denmark as scores of Muslims were killed by gunfire across the country. Arson attacks by Muslims numbered in the hundreds, and fire departments struggled to combat what was being turned into a weapon of war by the more poorly armed Muslims.

April 25 — May 2

Violence continued in a similar manner, with both sides ignoring the calls of the government to cease fighting. Tense confrontations between armed citizens and the police were common, as the militias, already showing increased organization and purpose, disputed the authority of a government that had, they felt, failed so completely to safeguard the security of the country.

Vicious street-fighting throughout areas bordering Muslim ghettos had driven people living in those areas to retreat — Muslims further into the ghettos, non-Muslims out toward solidly non-Muslim areas. This gradual creation of a no-go zone between the combatants only reinforced the sense for some that this was a war, however unconventional. Television crews from around the world streamed into Denmark to report on the situation, almost inconceivable in a Northern European country.

May 3

Taking advantage of the lull in the fighting brought about by the increasing physical separation of the combatants and a day of unusually poor weather, the Danish police and army moved to encircle all substantial Muslim ghettos in the country. Sporadic fighting continued where the state presence was light. Militia leaders insisted on retaining forces in strategic positions and being consulted on developments. TV crews were now camped on both sides of the front line, broadcasting both sides of the unfolding crisis around the world.

May 4

The situation by noon on May 4 had largely stabilized as follows: All major and most minor Muslim ghettoes were now surrounded by an as-yet chaotic mixture of army, police and militia forces. The abovementioned no-go zones, a series of rings between one to three blocks in thickness around each ghetto, were now empty of people, with many of the buildings having been gutted by fire and looting. The political scene was still in flux, it being unclear to what extent civilian leaders retained effective control of the military or police forces, which made few serious attempts to disarm the militias.

The situation inside the ghettoes was known to the world through the broadcasts of the TV crews inside, many of them from Arabic-language news channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. A steady stream of Muslim suffering, threatening, and ululating was transmitted around the world.

The Danish kroner and stock market had now both collapsed, prompting leaders of business and industry to act decisively to pull the country back from the brink. What exactly might accomplish this was unclear, however, given that the authority of the government itself had been greatly weakened.

May 6

The Danish Prime Minister announced his intention to dissolve the government and step down from his position. Various key members of the Danish parliament struggled to put together an emergency caretaker government.

The Danish police and army started to see significant numbers of defections to key militias. Leaders of the most powerful militias, backed by one of Denmark’s most senior generals, issued a joint statement on national television declaring that the caretaker government being hastily cobbled together by key Danish members of parliament would be illegitimate should it even be formed. They declared their intention to deal with the Muslim situation in their own way, thereby guaranteeing the continued existence and security of the Danish State.

Significantly, they issued two further proclamations: that no Danish citizens would be subject to punishment by law for using reasonable force to defend themselves, their loved ones, or their property, and that Muslims were no longer to be considered Danish citizens unless pronounced so by the militia councils then in the process of being formed.

May 8

The consolidation of political control of the vast majority of the ghettoes by radical elements, many of them Al-Qaeda affiliated, was made clear by the rebuffing of all attempts to establish formal contacts with the ghettoes, formal or informal. Indeed, one militia member approaching a ghetto through the surrounding no-go zone under cover of a white flag was shot and killed by a sniper.

TV broadcasts from the camps continued, providing a stream of coverage 24 hours a day from both Muslim and non-Muslim news crews. However, it gradually became clear that they were being censored, if not directed, by extremist Muslims, consisting as they did largely of exhortations to jihad and footage of dead and wounded Muslims within the ghettoes. A number of TV crews managed to make their way back through the no-go zones to the Danish side. They spoke of the growing squalor and rapidly-depleting food supplies within, and the total control that militant Islamic elements now enjoyed.

May 9 — May 10

A well-organized, double-pronged night attack from within one of the larger ghettoes temporarily pushed through the no-go zone to give Muslim elements control of a three-by-three block segment of a Danish area. Using small arms fire, RPGs and a certain amount of light machine gun support, an estimated fifty fighters expelled Danish forces from the area by midnight.

Though a concerted counterattack spearheaded by an armoured unit forced the Muslim militants back out of their positions by early the next morning, total casualties taken by the Danish forces (militias and army elements) were heavy. This spoke volumes as to the infiltration of Denmark by experienced jihadis, and the extent to which Muslims had armed themselves in preparation for some sort of societal breakdown.

May 13

A demonstration of some 20,000 international peace activists was staged in Århus. Declaring their intent to enter the no-go zone to deliver a message of peace and goodwill, the demonstration organizers ignored the insistence of the Århus militias that they would not allow it to proceed. Around midday, the already rather chaotic crowd of demonstrators arrived at the Århus ghetto constituting its destination, only to rapidly disintegrate when anarchist infiltrators and militia members started to clash. Molotov cocktails, stones, and baseball bats on the one side were met with gunfire on the other, resulting in heavy casualties (though few fatalities) among the demonstrators. Dozens of anarchists and related elements manage to make their way through the no-go zones to join the ‘anti-imperialist’ cause of their Muslim ‘comrades.’

May 15 — May 23

A day of demonstrations planned by Muslims throughout Europe to display solidarity with the ‘new Jews’ spiralled out of control, leading to huge riots in major European cities. Riot police were unable to regain control of the situation in parts of France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden, where key Muslim ghettoes saw a complete breakdown of law and order following their ostensibly temporary abandonment by the police.

Rocked by these events, the Swedish and Dutch governments denounced Denmark for its heavy-handed approach to the ‘unrest’ it was facing. In contrast, the French government issued a statement of unequivocal support, and declared its intention to maintain the security of the French state at all costs.

Due to the physical proximity to Denmark of the now uncontrollable Malmö region of Sweden and the notable lack of Scandinavian solidarity on Muslim issues, Denmark closed its road and sea connections with Sweden. Militias and ex-navy elements stepped up patrols of the Danish coast near Malmö to prevent the possible infiltration into Denmark of radical Islamic elements in Sweden.

May 26 — June 4

Multiple suicide bombings in European cities claimed thousands of lives in public buildings and on public transport. Paris, Birmingham, Amsterdam, Seville, Rome and Brussels were particularly badly hit. The inability of the security forces of said countries to break up the plots is considered to be largely due to the exponential growth of unaffiliated cells of self-motivated Islamic fanatics.

Increasing polarization along Danish lines started to become more visible throughout Europe, as European governments found themselves swept along by the same forces that resulted in the eventual disintegration of the Danish government. At the same time, Muslim governments around the world moved towards adopting, more or less willingly, hard-line stances with respect to all European nations, threatening dire consequences if Muslims in the Danish ghettoes continued to suffer.

June 7

Smoke drifted high above the ghettoes as Muslims were forced to start cremating the corpses of the many hundreds, if not thousands, of Muslims now dead from wounds, disease, and starvation. The inter-ghetto coordination evident in this (strictly un-Islamic) activity prompted speculation that it also served as a propaganda tactic, but of the increasingly dire situation in the ghettoes there was by now little doubt. The electricity supply had been almost completely cut in the early days of the crisis, as had the telephone grid. The mobile phone network still covered the ghettoes to some extent, thereby allowing a degree of communication, but deliveries of food, medicine and other supplies were kept to a bare minimum by militias.

The cremations were covered widely by the international media, with some commentators, particularly in the Muslim world, drawing comparisons with the Nazi death camps and the Warsaw ghetto.

June 9

The militias increased the electricity supply to the ghettoes, simultaneously announcing a plan to start gradual evacuations of Muslims to safe areas where they can be prepared for deportation to their countries of origin. Within hours, the OIC issued replied with a counter-statement saying that its member states would not participate in the ethnic cleansing of their fellow Muslims from Europe, and would close their airspace to Danish flights attempting to deport Muslims. Danish construction companies officially started work on a complex of internment camps across the country for the purpose of holding and pacifying the country’s Muslim population until a permanent resolution to the crisis could be found.

June 10

Remarkable scenes ensued on the Muslim side of the no-go zone in Odense as approximately fifty Muslims, mainly women and children, marched out into the zone holding white flags and banners saying ‘We Surrender’ in Danish. The leaders of the group were seen to become involved in a brief altercation with two masked Muslim men, an altercation which ended when one of the men drew a handgun and carried out a point-blank execution of three Muslim women. Its progress thus halted, the group was forced to return to the ghetto.

June 19

A joint militia council announced a plan to sweep all ghettoes one by one, crushing all armed resistance, and relocating all Muslims to the rapidly growing internment camp complex, women and children in one set of camps, males aged 16 or over in another. These plans were announced by loudspeaker into every ghetto in the country, with supplementary information to the effect that resistance of any sort would not be tolerated. As the announcement was made, all water, sewage, electricity, gas, phone, mobile phone, and Internet services to the ghettoes were cut, as were all deliveries of food and medical supplies. Muslim leadership elements announced their intention to fight off the assaults, inshallah.

June 20 — June 23

An Al-Qaida cell consisting of white converts, having infiltrated Denmark from Germany, unleashed a sarin nerve gas attack on the Copenhagen public transport system, killing 98 and leaving a further 2,000 in need of medical attention. Punitive counter-attacks on ghettoes by militias, their ranks swollen by a fresh batch of army and police defectors, caused thousands of casualties as strategic areas of key ghettoes were cleansed of Muslims in scenes of extraordinary brutality.

June 24

The Reverend Jesse Jackson arrived outside the largest ghetto in Copenhagen as a self-appointed peace envoy. His convoy was destroyed by large-calibre sniper fire as it crossed the no-go zone. Both sides claimed responsibility.

June 26

U.S. President Al Gore declared Islam to be a religion of peace.


Discussion and Analysis

The scenario above is not intended as a prediction of what is likely to transpire with respect to Islam in Denmark or any other country. Rather, it is intended as a narrative, stitched together out of a large number of events (such with much precedent, some less) to try and stimulate an examination of the long-term implications of the Islamization of European countries, and certain issues that may have to be dealt with in fighting it. It is reasonably plausible in certain respects, and less so in others, but it is hoped that it will at least act as a springboard for further discussion.

Islam as Conspiracy

When one discusses the existential threat posed to European nations by their large and rapidly growing Muslim populations with those not yet convinced of it, one of the most commonly-heard objections is that the notion smacks of a conspiracy theory. ‘So they’ve come here to take over, have they?’ goes the incredulous response. This line of thought, though misconceived, is superficially persuasive to some degree and not easily refutable by simply pointing out that some small minority of Muslims in each country is in fact quite vocal about its desires in this respect. As such, it deserves some discussion here.

The ‘Good Cop, Bad Cop’ analogy has often been suggested to provide a model for understanding Muslim behaviour in certain regards: Bad Cop carries out terrorist atrocity, Good Cop expresses profound sorrow but suggests that attacks will continue as long as certain demands are not met. However, in this model the Good Cop and the Bad Cop act on the basis of an explicit understanding of their roles, in pursuit of an objective agreed upon in advance. As one assumes that Islamist lobby groups and would-be terrorists are not actively colluding, we must answer the question of how an analogous coordination could take place, or abandon the model.

The coordinating force in question is, of course, Islam itself. Given the religious totalitarianism intrinsic to it and the imperative it contains to expand the geographical domain of that totalitarianism, it is hardly surprising that Muslims in a non-Muslim society should pursue Islamization, and that they should pursue it in a variety of ways given the broad spectrum of personalities, backgrounds, skills, and social standings they will be drawn from. There is no reason why Muslims cannot reference the actions of other Muslims they have never been in contact with in attempting to convince Europeans to meet their demands. Indeed, they will be extremely likely to do so, as these actions can comprise the single most obvious dilemma facing said Europeans with respect to their Muslim populations.

Consider the suggestion of the Muslim Council of Britain to the British government that incorporating Muslim holidays into the official calendar and allowing Shari’a-based divorce could help to reduce the rage felt by the UK’s Muslim population and prevent future terrorist attacks. The manifest implausibility of this notion makes its opportunistic nature clear. The MCB may have genuinely disapproved of the attack and may have silently cheered it, but the opportunity would have been utilized regardless. Thus, terrorists and lobbyists achieve a high degree of teamwork without even having any specific knowledge of each other’s existence. Asking who acts as a coordinator would be equivalent to asking who ‘coordinates’ the anti-Semitism of Nazis, be it expressed through political activism or attacks on Jews. In this case, Nazism itself is the sole and sufficient coordinator. An alternative formulation would be to say that the Islamization conspiracy is coordinated by none other than Islam itself, the invisible hand that takes the activities of millions of Muslims unknown to each other and combines them into a coherent whole, clearly visible to those with the will to see it.

What is most interesting about this conspiracy is its public nature. The texts, doctrine, laws, and history of Islam, together with much analysis of the same, are more available to non-Muslims than ever before, along with a steady flow of news about their global behaviour, and a large and growing number of Muslims who explicitly declare the supremacist nature of their religion. Despite this, it remains quite invisible to huge numbers of otherwise intelligent non-Muslims, who assume the problems caused with remarkable consistency by Muslims and only Muslims, wherever they are to be found in large numbers, are teething troubles that would disappear if only some list of conditions were fulfilled.

There are surely many people of good will in European countries who are not as concerned as they should be about Islam due to their inability to distinguish between harmless concessions to a community genuinely eager to fit in, and the latest of the thousand cuts that Islam hopes to defeat us with. Formulating a strategy for helping such people see why even minor concessions should be opposed, perhaps in the manner outlined above, could be a valuable activity.

State Monopoly on Violence

The extent to which non-government actors can prepare themselves to usefully combat Islamization will be a function of, amongst other things, the availability of firearms in their respective countries. One of the most significant effects of the right to bear arms enshrined in the Second Amendment of the U.S. constitution is the way in which it allows the creation of a safety net of sorts, a fallback position for the nation at large. Given that some degree of physical coercion, or at least the threat of such coercion, must exist for a society to maintain itself, it follows that concentrating the means of that coercion (firearms and the relevant training, in a modern context) in a single agent (the government) is an extremely risky strategy when the competence, benevolence, and political courage of that agent cannot be taken for granted. In contrast, allowing these means to be distributed more widely throughout a given society creates a more fracture-resistant polity, where the failure of a single part of the system cannot result in catastrophic failure, considered here to be the complete breakdown of law and order and an ensuing descent into chaos.

This all being the case, the legal availability of firearms in a country is likely to prove a key indicator of how, and how effectively, that country will respond to Islamization when it becomes clear that the problem is existential and government either cannot or will not respond appropriately. Of course it is likely that, as Islamization proceeds and the intractable nature of the problems it creates becomes ever more evident, the illegal acquisition of firearms will become more common. However, it must be observed here that a lack of legal access to firearms over a period of some decades creates a further two handicaps in addition to this obvious legal one. The second, more serious handicap, is the lack of firearms training and experience among the population at large, a difficulty which cannot be remedied easily or quickly. The third handicap, more serious still, is the psychological handicap, whereby the vast majority of the population of an entire country has been stripped of the very notion that citizens might have an obligation to bear arms to protect themselves, their loved ones, and their ways of life. Though some will undoubtedly reacquire this mentality quickly, most people will find themselves adrift in a world bearing no resemblance to that which they thought they lived in.

As such, one of the most pressing issues facing those who would oppose Islamization is the addressing of these three handicaps, in order of seriousness. The psychological handicap, of course, can, in principle, be addressed anywhere. The issue of training can be addressed legally in some European countries, and even natives of those where it cannot could, in principle, travel to those where it can to receive firearms training. It is not, after all, illegal to learn to shoot unless one happens to be screeching ‘Allahu Akbar’ at the same time. Failing that, even firearms knowledge gained from books (how does a semi-automatic pistol operate?) would prove itself significantly better than nothing in a time of need.

It is important to stress that circumventing the legal handicap by acquiring any kind of firearm on the black market would be a bad idea at present, and the current author does not advocate any such activity. Things will presumably take care of themselves in that respect when the situation has deteriorated sufficiently. Those fortunate enough to live in countries where firearms can be acquired legally should take full advantage of the opportunities so afforded as soon as possible, bearing in mind that governments have been known to introduce draconian restrictions on the legality of firearms in very short periods of time.

Collapse of Apparatus of State

Perhaps the single greatest unknown when considering the likely course of future developments is the role of the state. Where the apparatus of state is strong and considered legitimate by the population it governs, will it seek primarily to stifle opposition to Islamization, for whatever reason? Will it remain effectively neutral, maintaining order and enforcing the law as even-handedly as possible? Or will it turn on its Muslim population, killing, incarcerating, and deporting them in an effort to reverse the inexorable Islamization it has belatedly woken up to?

Not only would it appear to be futile to try and answer these questions, the legitimacy accorded the state will itself vary as a function of how it acts, potentially undermining its ability to act in any coherent manner at all. A problem of this complexity is difficult to begin to conceptualize, let alone impose any intellectual order on.

Is it possible to say anything concrete in this respect at all? There is one observation that is surely worth making. Given the strength of the state in all Western European countries, and the legitimacy it enjoys (deservedly, as a brief look at vast swathes of the Earth’s surface will make clear), it seems highly unlikely that it will simply disintegrate in the manner outlined in the fictional scenario that makes up the first section of this document. Though new, non-governmental organizations will surely spring up to supplement or contend with the organs of state in response to Islamization, it seems safe to assume that the apparatus of state in European countries will continue to occupy centre-stage in this drama for some time yet.

Why then, does the scenario outlined in the Danish Civil War diverge so drastically from this prediction? The reason is simply that it is incumbent on us to consider worst-case scenarios, not best-case scenarios. In the best-case scenario, state and people would decisively oppose and reverse Islamization, using whatever level of violence (in the broadest sense of the term, including all forms of physical coercion) were necessary to secure their countries against the totalitarian political system that Islam is. Furthermore, they would do so soon, before Muslim populations became so large as to make a relatively orderly solution to the problem impossible.

In such an eventuality, no particularly careful analysis of the process of de-Islamization would be necessary. Indeed, the main problem would be determining how to restrict the measures brought to bear on Muslims to the minimum necessary, rather than allowing a resentful population to create great suffering for millions. However, though political parties explicitly opposed to the Islamic penetration of their countries have started to become more visible presences on their respective domestic political scenes, it is hard to predict a rapid change in attitudes towards Islam on the part of major political parties and thousands of influential people in the media and academia. The sheer magnitude of the intellectual and emotional investment in their current stance vis-à-vis Islam prohibits it.

Given the overwhelming momentum of our current political apparatus then, it seems that private citizens must do what they can to prepare for what may come without expecting a great deal of their governments, at least in the near future. They should remain open to the possibility that future events may shift those with political power towards their way of thinking, whilst preparing themselves for the possibility of a total collapse of the authority of the state.

Concept of Citizenship

The economic analogy afforded by the phenomenon of inflation is extremely instructive in any consideration of the questions of group identity or group membership. Consider the familiar chain of events when countries start printing money to cover obligations that cannot be met any other way (public salaries, government bonds, etc.). The entry into circulation of new money without a commensurate creation of new wealth means that each unit of currency corresponds to less wealth, with prices rising as a result.

Though the motivations underlying the ‘printing’ of new group memberships (i.e. the issuing of citizenship or equivalent status) are clearly different, a partial analogy can be drawn in terms of the effects. In a country like Japan, which has yet to develop an interest in allowing mass immigration from the developing world, citizenship (group membership in the Japanese nation) is remarkably clear-cut. To be Japanese is to be a member of that ethnic, linguistic and cultural community located on the Japanese archipelago. Though it is possible in principle to obtain Japanese citizenship, it is extremely difficult and time-consuming and will not result in one being thought of as Japanese by the Japanese. Why not? Because one would simply not be Japanese, irrespective of government or media propaganda to the contrary (propaganda which does not exist). This state of affairs, in which the conditions for citizenship are universally agreed upon by group members and not undergoing non-organic, top-down attempts at revision, can be likened to a stable currency. In Japan, Japanese citizenship is a solid gold coin, its value unquestioned in social transactions.

When a government ‘prints’ new citizenships at a rate necessitated by mass immigration, it is attempting to create a new set of criteria for group membership. In effect, it is saying that the old criteria, evolved over a period of centuries, if not millennia, are to be rewritten by bureaucratic fiat, under cover of a smokescreen provided by meaningless boilerplate about ‘shared values,’ and ‘diversity.’ The timescale for this rewriting will be massively compressed relative to the initial evolutionary timescale, making gradual adjustment impossible. As this process advances, two things will become clear: the legal reality of the citizenship of the newcomers, and the utter incompatibility of at least some portion of them with the still deeply-entrenched membership criteria of the natives.

Consider the case of Abu Hamza, that charmingly photogenic favourite of the British tabloids up until his arrest, trial, and incarceration by the British state. Given that the Home Office granted him a British passport after his (reputedly bigamous) marriage to a UK citizen, he was declared, in effect, by the state to be as British as anyone else.

But what could this possibly mean? If an Egyptian-born radical Muslim who incited violence against non-Muslims, advocated global jihad, and was implicated in a variety of terrorism-related activities could be British, then we are forced to one of two conclusions. The first is that the category of the British citizen had degenerated to the point where it was compatible with these activities, in which case it would be hard to see why it should be granted any significance. The other is that the state was simply wrong, and that, legal issues notwithstanding, Abu Hamza was not British. Either way, the currency of citizenship would have been debased, with a British passport ‘just not worth what it used to be.’

This is the first step in the inflationary analogy. The second occurs in extreme cases, in which governments, not understanding the relationship between printing money and inflation, start blaming their monetary woes on others, as in Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. The official rate of inflation in Zimbabwe in late 2007, measurable in the thousands of percent per annum, was not, Mr. Mugabe would have us believe, a result of government policies that had predictably destroyed the economy, but of an international conspiracy masterminded by the Blair government. In response, the Mugabe regime responded by criminalizing the perfectly natural, indeed inevitable, price-raising of retailers, introducing price controls that would force them to sell at a loss. The eventual outcome of this saga is not yet clear, but one suspects that Zimbabwe will not be a happier place for it.

The causes of inflation being reasonably well understood, such madness is uncommon. It seems to be universal in the immigration analogue however, at least among very significant parts of the government, media, and population at large, who claim that racism, xenophobia, fascism, or some combination thereof is to blame for the reluctance of European populations to be taken over by Islam. Attempts to criminalize the perfectly natural responses of the original populations become (such as vociferous criticism or mockery of Islam) more prevalent. Again, the outcome of these developments is not yet clear, but it is unlikely to be positive. The only thing that can be predicted with certainty is the eventual rejection of the notion of citizenship foisted on people by their governments, in the same way that money is increasingly rejected Zimbabwe in favour of barter economies. This will be a catastrophe for immigrants who succeeded in genuinely adapting to their new homes. A new legal structure for citizenship, as inclusive as possible of existing immigrants whilst providing effective defence against Islam, should be considered a matter of some urgency.

Bottom of the Slide

Notably absent from discussions about appropriate responses to the Islamization of Europe is the concept of the end game. If those opposing Islamization, in whatever manner, in whatever part of Europe, over whatever time frame, succeed in achieving their goals, what sort of Europe would we then be living in? How would it most obviously differ from the Europe of today? Here, in closing, the author will make clear his own answers to these questions. These will be predicated on the following six notions.

1 — Islam is a Totalitarian Political Ideology

Though we are regularly treated to the refrain ‘Islam is not a monolith,’ Islam is in fact a remarkably consistent and enduring set of ideas about the world and how human beings should behave in it. In Hugh Fitzgerald’s formulation, it is doubly totalitarian, both in terms of the demands it makes on the believer, and its claim to political dominance over the whole world. Given that no aspect of human life is left unregulated by Islam, and no human life considered outside its authority (as Muslim or as dhimmi), seeking to arrive at some modus vivendi with it is pointless and counterproductive. Its sway over law, custom, and the general mode of life in Europe must be reduced to nil.

2 — Islam is Unreformable on any Timescale of Relevance to the Problem

The Islamic world has occasionally played host to trends which we could consider to be reformist in nature. There have been times and places where freethinkers have flourished, and scepticism about the central claims of Islam permitted. However, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Muslims have been remarkably successful in extinguishing these movements in their attempts to protect orthodoxy, and their ability to do so is still something to be reckoned with, even in European countries. Moreover, Islam as a whole seems to be on a downward trajectory in this respect, with supposedly moderate Muslim countries seeing Shari’a law extend its authority (Turkey, Malaysia) as others dissolve into failed states dominated by psychotic theocrats (Pakistan, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan).

As a result, the oft-discussed issue of Islamic reform is in fact wholly irrelevant to any discussion of the response to Islamization. There is simply no reason to believe that reform, if possible at all, could take place on a timescale which might affect the course of events in Europe. The lay of the battlefield and the forces arrayed upon it will surely be clear within twenty years. Those who believe that Islam, a protean force, and one of the most successful political ideologies of all time, will reform itself just in time to save us the bother of having to fight it are engaging in as deluded a bout of wishful thinking as could be imagined. This is not to deny that some nominal Muslims in Europe will drift away from it, but drift is not reform.

3 — Islam is Forever

Islam has an unmatched ability to hollow out that which it absorbs. Stripping away intellectual and artistic freedoms to replace them with a predilection for frothing, ululating, and burning effigies, having once taken possession of a stretch of the Earth’s surface, it admits no rivals to its dominion unless defeated by force of arms. Unlike an ideology such as Communism, it cannot be discredited by its material failures. It is not an economic policy that can be abandoned if it fails. One cannot try it on as one might try on a hat, free to take it off and try another if it fails to please. Once a majority of the people in a polity accept it, it will prove impossible to dislodge.

Islam is not a dark valley from which one eventually emerges after a period of struggle. It attacks too furiously and successfully the habits of thought that would be required to undermine it. For this reason, the battle with Islam must be considered existential in nature. To lose it would be to accept the utter destruction of one’s way of life and everything good in it.

4 — Demographics Favour Islam

If the Muslim population of a country were to peak at, say, 1% of the total, it could perhaps be ignored. After all, Nazism is also a murderous, totalitarian ideology, but its continuing presence in European countries does not appear to be an existential threat to them. However, as is well known, Muslim birth rates are significantly higher than those of non-Muslims throughout Europe. No pernicious ideology (Communism, Nazism, etc.) that has afflicted Europe in recent history has benefited from this dynamic. Yet it is a dynamic of massive implications.

Imagine if, by some means unknown, the Muslim population of the Netherlands as a fraction of the whole were to halve overnight, from 6% to 3%. This huge change would have no significant effect on the long-term trajectory of Islamization in the country. It would merely delay it by as long as it took it to rise from 3% to 6% in the first place, if one assumes identical growth profiles both times. This period, surely not more than two decades, would be a historical blink of the eye. Delaying the Islamization of a country in this highly unrealistic manner, though hugely beneficial in and of itself, does not represent a solution to the problem. Indeed, it ensures its continuation. As such, the Muslim population of a country seeking to avoid Islamization must be stabilized, and at a level low enough to remove Islam from the public sphere.

5 — Separatism is not an Option

There may be those who think that separatism is the most likely path for events to take. Can we not simply detach ourselves from our Muslim populations, letting them go their way while we go ours? One could envisage a population transfer in which Muslims and non-Muslims sorted themselves out in two geographically separate blocs. Might this not provide the best solution to our growing dilemma?

Not only is the answer to this question no, it is vital to understand that this would be one of the worst conceivable outcomes for European peoples, because it would solve nothing while giving the impression of having solved everything. Here we will demonstrate why this would be the case.

Assuming the validity of the above four points, we would, after partition, be faced with a viciously intolerant and supremacist Islamic mini-state, almost certainly led by extremist elements given the acrimony that would result from partition. This state would have to have been granted airports, ports, power stations, and other key infrastructural items to allow it to be viable at all. The chances of it being economically self-sufficient would, however, be virtually nil, so it would be obliged to extract some sort of subsidies from somewhere, presumably the parent state. Its fertility rate would still be higher than that of the parent state, which would create incremental increases in its demands for financial support and further pressures for new geographical concessions due to population increase.

The Muslim state would continue to represent a terrorist threat to the parent state, and would make continuous attempts to subvert and destroy it. It would be able to reinforce its position militarily in a way which would have been impossible if it had consisted solely of scattered Muslim ghettoes under the watchful eye of the original state. With control over its own borders, it could import the arms and equipment needed to build defences that would make it extremely hard to take by conventional assault, as per Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.

Lastly, there would always be elements within the parent state itself wedded to the belief that the granting of some list of concessions would enable peaceful coexistence. Such elements would represent an ever-present threat to the parent state, a threat which would presumably have no parallel in the Muslim state. There could even be Muslim elements within the parent state, ‘moderate’ Muslims who had been allowed to remain as they had ‘integrated’ so well. Given the track record of such people to date in Europe, it is impossible to dismiss the possibility of their continuing collusion with their co-religionists across the border.

Those who consider this prognosis too pessimistic should consider the case of India, which is illuminating in some, though not all, of these respects. Created in 1947 through the partition of British India into a Hindu state and a Muslim state, India had a Muslim population of approximately 8% at independence, with West and East Pakistan having Hindu populations of approximately 25% each. Over the course of the next 60 years, the westernmost part of the now-fractured Muslim state, Pakistan, would drive out or kill nearly all of this Hindu population, which now stands at less than 1%. The easternmost part would see genocide and ethnic cleansing force the Hindu population down to approximately 10%. This as Muslims clamoured for their fundamental human right to self-determination in Kashmir!

For its part, India would see its Muslim population grow from 8% to an official figure of 13%. However, mass illegal immigration from Bangladesh has swelled the actual figure well above this total, to an estimated 16%. India continues to be afflicted by endemic terrorist attacks, and faces the same existential demographic issues as does any other state with a Muslim minority. What will it do when its Muslim population reaches 25%? Repartition? Why would this repartition not then be followed by the genocide and ethnic cleansing of Hindus in the new Muslim state once more? How would it avoid leaving an Islamic seed in the new, reduced India, to start the cycle over again? When and how does this process come to a halt for India? When Islam reforms?

We must not walk this path in Europe. If the problem must be dealt with, it must be dealt with permanently once the political will exists. Separation is defeat in the long term. Should it come about due to forces beyond the control of those fighting Islamization, it must be considered a temporary phase, to be addressed with all haste.

6 — Europe Owes Islam Nothing

Absurdly inflated claims to have invented virtually the whole of modern mathematics and science are routine from Muslims and their apologists. In fact, we owe Islam little in these respects, and nothing in any other. Immigrants who have come to Europe, worked hard, obeyed the law and done their best to integrate into their new homes must be considered valued citizens on a par with any others. However, Muslims can overwhelmingly be placed in one of two categories: those who are fiercely committed to Islamizing their host societies, and those who have vociferously rejected and opposed any critical examination of their religion by non-Muslims. None of these people are owed anything by those who see no good reason to have their way of life destroyed by a 7th-century war-fighting cult. There are billions of people in the developing world who would dearly love the opportunity to build a better life in Europe. Those who gain it, only to spit in the faces of those who have taken them in, cannot expect to be treated with particular consideration.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
The nature of the problem is made clear by the first five points above, and the moral nature of a robust response to Islamization the sixth. Islam is a totalitarian political ideology, impossible to reform on any useful timescale, impossible to supplant once deeply embedded, demographically destined to become ever more threatening, from which we cannot simply separate, and which we owe no consideration. What would a Europe that had succeeded in defending itself against this cancer look like?

The answer is twofold. Firstly, it would not have many Muslims in it. As a rough figure, and taking into account European experience to date, a Muslim population of not more than 0.5% might prove manageable. How this population could be kept at or beneath this level is not clear.

Secondly, a Europe no longer threatened by Islam would have no geographical concentrations of Muslims at all. Muslims who wish to live in Muslim ghettoes are surely capable of locating a suitable ghetto in their own country and moving there. There is no reason to allow their recreation in civilized countries.

Given that Muslims will be unlikely to give up their religion, however nicely we might ask them, there are only three ways of achieving this state of affairs. They are discussed below, in order of increasing unpleasantness.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
1 — Inducing Muslims to Leave of Their Own Free Will

The best solution for all concerned is would be that Muslims are persuaded that their future does not lie in Europe. Measures introduced to bring this about could include the following:

• Prohibition of Muslim immigration
  
• New legislation banning halal butchery
  
• Prohibition of new mosque construction
  
• Drastic restrictions on Muslim access to welfare benefits
  
• Punitive taxation on Muslims to fund security services
  
• Closures of existing mosques
  
• Closures of Muslim schools
  
• Banning the hijab/niqab/burka
  
• Criminalization of verbal support for Muslim terrorists
  
• Prohibition of public gatherings of Muslims on security grounds
  
• Prohibition of Muslim-Muslim marriage

The effectiveness of such measures, implemented in concert by an angry populace and a determined government, could convince many Muslims that Islam’s time in Europe was drawing to a close, inducing large numbers to leave. Given that they would no doubt be accompanied by a good deal of freelance hostility towards Muslims, they could be very effective indeed. However, there would almost certainly be many who would stay, whether due to a genuine attachment to their host countries, their appreciation of the hideousness of their own countries, or a desire to fight it out. After all, the growing hostility to Muslims in Europe does not yet seem to have dampened their desire to live there.

2 — Mass Deportations

The second way of reducing the Muslim population of a country would be to simply throw huge numbers of them out. As such a policy would be unlikely to be adopted all of a sudden, it would probably be implemented on the heels of the first option.

Let us consider some numbers. If a single passenger aircraft carries 250 people, then 4,000 flights can remove 1,000,000 people, approximately the Muslim population of the Netherlands. At ten flights a day, this process would take a little over a year, so the gross physical plausibility of the scheme is easy to establish. Furthermore, the legal issues involved in such a mass deportation are irrelevant, as any country embarking on a scheme of this nature would already be far beyond caring about such niceties, or about what derogatory comments might be made about it at the UN.

Unfortunately, the logistical difficulties would be fairly considerable, to put it mildly, and would undoubtedly necessitate the preparatory internment of the entire Muslim population. This could not be achieved without the massive application of brute force, and would be a process likely to spiral out of control given the numbers of people in question.

It also assumes that Muslim countries would be prepared to take in hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of angry, confused, impoverished, sickly refugees. They would be acquiescing in the cessation of the flow of remittances the refugees would otherwise have sent home, and the loss of a considerable amount of political influence in Europe. It is therefore entirely possible that they would simply refuse to allow such deportations to take place, by closing their airspace and cutting all diplomatic relations with the countries in question. The attitude of the Arab world to the plight of the Palestinians, allowed to rot away in their filthy refugee camps as long as they are of some political utility there, is extremely instructive in this regard.

Which brings us to option three.

3 — Genocide

The final option consists of genocide, i.e. the intentional, physical destruction of Islam in Europe. Note that this would not necessarily consist of the killing of all Muslims. As Muhammad himself would be quick to remind us, one can simply kill off the men and claim everyone else as booty. Given the low regard in which slavery is justifiably held in 21st century Europe, it is difficult to see how the booty option could usefully be applied. However, bearing in mind that the threat of Islam lies essentially in its menfolk, in principle, Muslim women could probably just be absorbed into the nation as a whole, Islam itself withering away as a result of a zero-tolerance policy.

Though a discussion of this nature might strike some as being somewhat off-colour, it is important to bear in mind that genocide is not being advocated here. Rather, it is being observed that genocide has been an ever-present factor during history, not least the history of the 20th century. Irrespective of the existence of this document or the exact nature of its content, the cloud of lurking genocide will grow ever-darker over Europe as Islamization proceeds. It would be intellectually and morally negligent not to point this out.

In the Danish scenario outlined in the first section of the document, it can be seen that the Danes quickly progress from option one to something that would constitute a preparation for options two or three, or, more likely, some combination of both. It is highly improbable that any solution to the dilemma posed to Europe by Islam will come about as a result of strict adherence to a single one of the three options. Far more likely is a scenario in which they are messily superimposed on each other as events disintegrate, moving out of the realm of control or prediction.